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Expenditures per FTE student have risen rapidly in real terms in public higher 
education in the United States for over three decads.  Two theory-grounded hypotheses 
have been advanced to explain this growth.  Baumol’s (1966) “cost disease” argument is 
a macroeconomic perspective arguing that industries heavily reliant on skilled labor have 
limited ability to increase productivity but must increase their wage rate above their 
productivity gains to compete for this skilled labor in the labor market.  Bowen’s (1980) 
“revenue theory of costs” proposes a microeconomic explanation that universities raise 
all they can and spend all they raise.  Bowen’s theis has been expanded into a behavioral 
theory by Martin (2011), who argues that the nexus of non-profit status, principal-agent 
confusion, and prestige seeking behavior are responsible for increased expenditures.  
Following Martin and Hill (2012), this study presents an econometric model that 
allocates expenditures to these two theoretical perspectives. 
Statewide real average expenditures per FTE student at Texas public universities 
increased 9% from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2011 following tuition deregulation.  
Analysis of yearly fixed effects suggests that thispolicy change led to an increase in real 
expenditures above pre-deregulation levels on the ord r of $1,400 per FTE student.  The 
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ratio of Bowen to Baumol expenses is highest at elite Research universities and is lowest 
at the least research intensive Master’s universitis. 
Additional tuition revenue was associated with a declin  of Bowen expenditures 
relative to Baumol expenditures at Research institutions of -5% while Emerging Research 
and Doctoral institution displayed substantial increases in Bowen expenditures relative to 
Baumol expenditures (6% and 4%).  This finding suggests that lower-level research 
universities with aspirations to higher research intensity increase their proportion of 
Bowen expenditures in conditions of expanding revenue.  Research universities used 
additional revenue to reduce an existing cross-institutional subsidy from graduate 
education to the rest of the institution. 
Keywords: Texas, econometrics, higher education, tuition deregulation, cost of 
higher education 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Colleges and universities today spend larger sums in real terms on a per student 
basis than at any previous time in American history.  This study is motivated by a simple 
question: Why has this spending increase occurred?  To answer this question, I examine a 
natural experiment—the deregulation of tuition in Texas in 2003—when a set of public 
higher education institutions in a restricted spending environment were, overnight, turned 
into institutions able to price their education services at essentially any level the market 
would support.  Observing changes in expenditures at these institutions provides insights 
into the decision-making that occurred when they were able to access an expanded source 
of income.  Were these institutions constrained by economic forces beyond their control, 
with increased funds used to address systemic labormarket issues?  Or were they able to 
direct new expenditures toward focused areas of their institutions to achieve specific 
goals?  Understanding the degree of agency institutions possess about expenditure 
decisions is critical to developing policy recommendations about the finance of public 
higher education. 
BACKGROUND  
The decreasing affordability of higher education has been an issue of scholarly 
interest for many years (Heller, 2001; Mumper, 2003) and has been identified as one of 
the key areas of recent scholarly work by Conner and Rabovsky (2011).  Students have 
taken on an increasingly large share of the costs of operating public higher education.  
Between 2005 and 2010, for example, net per student tuition increased both in dollars 
(from $7,116 to $8,611) as well as in percentage of operating revenues (21% to 24% ) at 
public research institutions (Kirshstein & Hurlburt, 2012).  The increasing role student 
tuition plays in funding university operations has led to a large increase in the level of 
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student debt over the last ten to fifteen years and there is evidence that this debt, in turn, 
constrains the choices of students after college (Rothstein & Rouse, 2010).  As costs have 
risen, scholars have sought explanations for the phenomena.  While some argue that 
decreased state appropriations play a key role in the burden taken on by students (Titus, 
2009), total expenditures at higher education institutions have risen at a level above the 
rate of inflation in the overall economy. 
Texas historically had tight Legislative control over institutional tuition and this 
control provided a check to growth in institutional expenditures.  Following tuition 
deregulation in 2003, however, this tight control was removed.  As a result, Texas 
provides a natural experiment to examine how expenditures change when constrained 
higher educational institutions are given the chance to increase real expenditures. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT  
National per student spending at public, four-year institutions has increased 
rapidly in the last three decades and dramatic increases in the real level of tuition paid by 
students provide most of the additional funds allowing this increase in spending.  In 
Texas prior to tuition deregulation per student spending was essentially flat.  Following 
tuition deregulation, real spending per student increased substantially.   
PURPOSE 
The research presented in this study uses the Texas case to demonstrate how 
universities allocate increases in expenditures—specifically whether those choices are 
constrained by macroeconomic factors in the general labor market (the Baumol 
hypothesis) or whether unresolved agency problems, the pursuit of institutional interests, 
and other microeconomic forces  instead explain expenditure decisions (the Bowen 
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hypothesis).  This research develops an econometric model of institutional spending 
patterns both before and after tuition deregulation. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Question 1: To what degree do the competing Baumol and Bowen hypotheses 
explain expenditure changes at public four-year institutions of higher education? 
Question 2: Do public, four-year institutions of higher education with 
strongly defined research missions exhibit different choices in expending these new 
funds? 
SIGNIFICANCE  
Both the Baumol and Bowen hypotheses contain elements of truth.  What is most 
significant about this study is measuring, in a natural experiment, the relative importance 
of the two explanations of increased spending in higher education and how those 
expenditures change.  This study also represents the first analysis that examines how 
these two explanations for expenditures are related to the level of research-intensity of 
the institution.  While this research is not an evaluation of potential policy responses, 
understanding the forces that are increasing spending at public four-year universities is 
critical to addressing the challenges that are caused by these increases.  To the extent, for 
example, that the Baumol hypothesis accounts for expenditures it is likely that the entire 
project of mass higher education as currently conceived is unsustainable and that 
fundamental changes in the delivery of education to post-secondary students must occur.  
On the other hand, to the extent that there are firm-level incentives pushing expenditures 
higher at universities, it is possible that regulation, control, and oversight of public higher 
education institutions could play an important role in shaping those incentives and in 
constraining the growth of these expenditures. 
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KEY ELEMENTS OF EXISTING L ITERATURE  
The explanation for rising costs in higher education with the longest intellectual 
history is the Baumol hypothesis, often referred to as the “cost disease.”  The basic 
argument of the Baumol hypothesis is that technological improvements increase 
productivity and wages in the general economy, particularly among capital-intensive 
“progressive” industries.  Labor-intensive “stagnant” i dustries are not able to achieve 
the same level of productivity gains as capital-intensive industries but must still pay 
market-level labor rates or lose employees to progressive sectors of the economy.  Absent 
qualitative changes in technology that increase labor productivity in stagnant sectors the 
cost of providing these labor-intensive services will thus increase more rapidly than 
general inflation in the economy (Baumol & Bowen, 1966).1 
An alternative explanation for the increase in higher education expenditures above 
the general rise of prices in the economy is provided by H. R. Bowen (1980).  Bowen 
studied cross-sectional expenditure data for public and private institutions.  He finds that 
there is a great divergence in per-student expenditures at universities and concludes that 
there is no external pressure enforcing standardized expenditure patterns on these 
institutions.  In particular there is no external pressure to lower costs because universities 
are shielded from competition by geographic location and service differentiation.  He 
concludes that what institutions categorized as needs “are arguments in favor of increased 
funding, not causes of increased costs” (H. R. Bowen, 1980, p. 16).  He also points out 
that efforts to increase efficiency will not reduce “ osts” but simply lead to a reallocation 
of spending.  In his view, only reductions in revenu  can lead to reduced expenditures. 
                                                
1 The initial work that developed this literature was written by William Baumol and William Bowen.  The 
main competing theory to this approach, to be covered, was developed by the unrelated Howard Bowen. 
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Martin (2011) develops a behavioral framework to grund the Bowen hypothesis 
in economic theory.  There are three main elements in his framework.  First, the pursuit 
of prestige occurs because higher education is an “experience good”; consumers of the 
good determine its quality by “experiencing” it as opposed to testing various suppliers of 
the good through a search procedure (Nelson, 1970).  Second, the constant activity of 
fund raising in higher education creates a “principal-agent problem” (Martin, 2011, p. 
162).  Third, the non-profit status of higher education institutions magnifies this 
principal-agent problem.  In a for-profit enterprise, there is a clear line of control from the 
property holders (principals) to their agents (the employees of the firm) through fractional 
ownership.  In a non-profit, however, there is no discrete ownership interest among the 
principals, whose property rights are held in common.  Most important, however, is the 
fact that any financial residual produced by the non-profit firm is spent within the 
institution on staff and not distributed to shareholders as dividends. 
METHOD  
This study employs an established econometric methodology to construct 
regression models that link total per FTE student expenditures to a set of theoretical and 
control variables.  Using the technique of partial derivatives, estimates of constant dollar 
yearly per student expenditures at Texas public univers ties are divided into amounts 
proportionally explained by the Baumol hypothesis, the Bowen hypothesis, and control 
instruments. 
ASSUMPTIONS AND L IMITATIONS  
The primary limitations imposed on this study involve the disaggregation of 
employment data available through the federal IPEDS system.  While expenditure data in 
IPEDS may be separated by the function of the expenditure (e.g., student services), labor 
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measurements are not similarly differentiated.  As a result, the econometric analysis in 
this research models all expenditures at institutions, including those expenditures 
incurred by auxiliary activities such as residence halls and athletic faculties.  Since 
auxiliary functions should (theoretically) be self-supporting, an ideal study would remove 
these expenditures and labor measurements from consideration of the rest of the 
enterprise.  It is possible that future studies employing the basic methodology from this 
study (but using more detailed state-collected data) could provide more precise modeling 
of the determinants of expenditures in the academic fun tions of the university and 
measure cross-subsidization between academic and auxiliary activities. 
SCOPE AND DELIMITATIONS  
The expenditure data for this study was collected from Texas public, four-year 
institutions before and after tuition deregulation n 2003.  The results of this model are 
only suggestive for public institutions in states where tuition either has been deregulated 
for some time or that function in an environment of regulated tuition.  In addition, the 
results from this analysis have only limited application to understanding expenditures at 
private institutions.  Finally, this study does not address how the quality of the 
educational product produced by increasing real expenditures might improve.  For 
example, increases in spending on student services might lead to increases in persistence 
and graduation through increased student engagement (Tinto, 1987). 
DEFINITIONS  
• FTE Student: Full Time Equivalent Student.  An institution has one FTE student 
for every 30 semester credit hours or 24 graduate seme ter credit hours. 
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• GASB: Government Accounting Standards Board.  Promulgates accounting 
regulations for governmental entities such as public institutions of higher 
education. 
• HC: Heteroscedastic-consistent estimate of standard errors. 
• HAC: Heteroscedastic and autocorrelation consistent estimate of standard errors. 
• IPEDS: Integrated Post-Secondary Education Data System.  A federal 
clearinghouse of verified and validated comparable data collected at the 
institutional level. 
• M-estimator: Robust regression technique that adjusts for heteroscedasticity. 
• MM-estimator: Robust regression technique that adjusts for heteroscedasticity and 
the influence of outliers. 
• NACUBO: National Association of College and University Business Officers.  
Professional organization that develops accounting categories for higher 
education expenditures. 
• NCES: National Center for Education Statistics.  Federal agency responsible for 
managing IPEDS. 
• SCH: Semester Credit Hours.  One SCH is awarded for attendance in one hour of 
classroom instruction over the course of a semester or for out-of-classroom work 
judged to be equivalent in content to one Carnegie Unit. 
• THECB: Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board.  The government agency 
charged with oversight of higher education in Texas. 
ORGANIZATION OF STUDY  
The substantive portion of this study contains four chapters.  Chapter 2 reviews 
the existing literature on costs in higher education and presents a legislative history of 
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tuition deregulation in Texas.  Chapter 3 describes th  econometric methodology used in 
this research.  Chapter 4 presents a descriptive analysis of the dependent and independent 
variables at the statewide and THECB institution type level then synthesizes these 
descriptions into an overall picture of changes in these variables for the state public 
university sector.2  Chapter 5 presents the results of the econometric model and answers 
the two research questions posed at the beginning of this chapter.  Chapter 6 interprets 
these results and presents findings from specific instruments in the model germane to the 
literature described in Chapter 2.  This final chapter ends with concluding thoughts about 
the implications of these findings for policy, the limitations of this research (and the 
consequences of these limitations), and ideas for additional research using the framework 
from this study. 
                                                
2 The Appendix to this dissertation lists the specific universities included in each THECB institution type. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Chapter 2 reviews in detail the two major competing heoretical hypotheses that 
explain increasing costs in higher education.  Following this comparison of the relevant 
theory the chapter then presents a legislative history of tuition deregulation in Texas.  
Before beginning this discussion, however, it is important to understand exactly what is 
being referred to as a “cost” in the literature. 
THINKING CLEARLY ABOUT “C OSTS” 
One of the challenges in communicating about spending in higher education is 
that the simple word “cost” is used for at least three disparate purposes.  By far the most 
common usage of “cost” involves research on the affordability of higher education.  
Dickeson (2006), for example, lists 27 potential explanations for how university 
mismanagement is increasing “costs” and decreasing access to higher education.  
Reynolds (1998) discusses how “statistics on gross tuition grossly exaggerate actual costs 
to most students and parents” (p. 105).  This firstuse of the word might be better thought 
of as “student cost.”  Student cost properly defined involves out-of-pocket expenses for 
tuition and fees as well as living expenses for fout  six years and the opportunity cost of 
working as opposed to studying.  Winston (1998) points out that this conception of costs 
is particularly harmful to our understanding of the economic pressures on higher 
education because it invokes a “business intuition” where costs and profits together are 
equal to the price charged—as opposed to the actual ircumstance in a non-profit firm 
where the net price paid plus a subsidy from other sources equals cost (p. 123).  This 
incorrect understanding, he argues, leads to a failure to recognize that price must increase 
if the level of the subsidy decreases.  In any event, “student costs”—and the discussion 
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about the role of state support in determining tuition—is really not about “costs” per se 
but rather about how the burden of paying for higher education is distributed. 
A second (and more fruitful) way to think about costs i  how they are measured at 
the level of the institution.  Adams, Hankins, and Schroeder (1978) describe two versions 
of this conception of cost as applied by the National Association of College and 
University Business Officers (NACUBO): “financial accounting,” the ledger record of 
what was paid for various goods and services and “cost accounting,” the effort at the 
level of the firm to apply these ledger records to its actions (p. 13).  Together these are 
the “institutional cost” perspective, the transactional description of the decisions made by 
university officials on how collected revenue is exp nded.  Assuming common 
accounting procedures, these institutional costs are theoretically comparable between 
public institutions operating under the same Governme tal Accounting Standards Board 
(GASB) standards. 
A significant difficulty in analyzing these expenditures, however, was created at 
the turn of the century by the imposition of a new accounting standard—GASB 34—that 
rendered many existing approaches to aggregating institutional financial data impossible.  
The new standard was put in place as of fiscal 2003 for all institutions with over $10 
million in revenue (Lasher & Sullivan, 2004).  This change in accounting convention 
makes it difficult to compare pre-2003 data to older historical trends and essentially 
impossible to compare public and private institutions, which operate under a different set 
of reporting standards.  In addition to these definitio al challenges, direct comparison of 
institutional cost categories at universities is difficult due to variation in institutional 
mission.  For example, Dill and Soo (2004) describe th  difficulty in distinguishing 
academic and research costs due to cross-subsidization of functions. 
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As a result, while the precise accounting of these in titutional costs is of interest 
at individual institutions—they are, after all, the numerical tally of the political fight that 
is the development of the budget and thus the purest expression of the true value the 
institution places upon its functions (Wildavsky, 196 )—the precise allocation of 
expenditures by department and function is generally n institution-specific concern.  
Adams et al. (1978), however, point out a final category of cost—“economic 
accounting”—that ties the actions of the firm to both the larger economy and to the 
individual choices of economic actors.  We might call this “actual cost”—the macro and 
microeconomic factors that dictate the production of education and research at the 
institution.  While detailed institutional cost comparisons are fraught with difficulty, 
higher level aggregations of these choices into broad economic accounting categories is 
less contentious and can help us understand the syst mic pressures faced by institutions.  
It is this third conception of “cost” that my research uses when referring to 
“expenditures.” 
THE BAUMOL HYPOTHESIS: EXPENDITURES RISE DUE TO DIFFERENTIAL 
PRODUCTIVITY GAINS IN THE ECONOMY  
The explanation for university expenditures rising above the general price level 
with the longest intellectual history is the Baumol hypothesis, often referred to as the 
“cost disease.”  The basic argument of the Baumol hypothesis is that technological 
improvements increase productivity and wages in the general economy, particularly 
among capital-intensive “progressive” industries.  Labor-intensive “stagnant” industries, 
are not able to gain the same level of productivity gains as capital-intensive industries but 
must pay market-level labor rates or lose employees to progressive sectors of the 
economy.  Absent qualitative changes in technology that increase labor productivity in 
stagnant sectors, the expenditures required to provide these services will increase more 
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rapidly than general inflation in the economy (Baumol & Bowen, 1966).  In addition, 
stagnant industries tend to be ones in which the labor itself is essentially the end product 
(Baumol, 1967); the canonical example is the production of classical music.  While 
Baumol’s original work is based on the provision of artistic services, Baumol and Batey 
Blackman (1995) suggest that universities are subjected to the same dilemma confronting 
many labor-intensive industries. 
In a later formulation of this approach, Baumol, Batey Blackman, and Wolff 
(1985) add a third type of industry—“asymptotically stagnant”—whose production 
function contains elements of stagnant and progressiv  elements.  These asymptotic 
industries have the initial potential to see high rates of productivity growth.  When 
additional capital is applied in these industries, however these investments have 
diminishing returns as the overall share of the cost of production shifts to the labor-
intensive elements of their production function.  An example is the shift in the relative 
cost of hardware and software in total computational costs (Baumol et al., 1985, p. 813). 
Cowen (1996b) points out that all production requires some irreducible input of 
labor; without it, capital is simply un-utilized.  As a result, if Baumol’s logic is correct, as 
productivity increases there are no “progressive” industries in the long term.  Cowen 
(1996a) expands on this arguing that, while unquantified, the aggregation of creativity 
over time yields substantial real productivity gains.  For example, while chamber 
orchestras in 1780 could play only Mozart and Hadyn, the same type of performance 
group today has access to a much wider potential repertoire.  Preston and Sparviero 
(2009) suggest a third refinement to address these concerns: “creative inputs” defined as 
“original ideas, concepts, actions, and inductive solutions to ill-defined problems” (p. 
243).  They suggest the act of creation is something that, fundamentally, cannot be 
replaced by mechanization.  While their application f r this refinement is in media 
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production, the notion is clearly transferrable to employees in higher education 
institutions in their research role. 
Besharov (2005) points out a significant weakness in the Baumol cost disease 
thesis: because there is no consumer welfare calculation, the theory provides no basis for 
arguing that (even accepting its logic) the provision of the good in question ought not to 
be allowed to decline.  If the price of the good rises and, on the margins, some consumers 
shift their purchases to another good, that is simply the operation of market forces.  
Baumol (2012), without perhaps fully realizing it, admits this is the case as he ticks off a 
list of vanished former services such as home milk delivery and elevator operators. 
The explicit link between higher education and future income streams makes this 
welfare calculation linkage even more powerful in hgher education.  To the extent that 
the existing delivery system cannot deliver knowledg  and credentials to those who need 
it, perhaps another, less labor intensive, delivery system would be able to do so.  For 
example, mass higher education could become a largely m chanistic, capital intensive 
activity devoted to workforce development while elite higher education becomes 
segmented off into a lifelong class indicator.  Indee , in a comment to Bowen’s 1967 
paper Bell (1968) points out that there has been no reduction in shaving activities due to 
the labor intensity of barbers (if anything shaving occurs more frequently) however the 
way the service is delivered has been radically changed through the development of the 
safety razor.  Similarly, retailers no longer divide bulk purchases for customers due to 
advances in packaging. 
On a policy level, if the Baumol hypothesis is correct, there is nothing to be 
“done” about these increases in expenditures.  Sectors such as education and health care 
will inevitably encompass a higher share of GDP.  This will not matter in the larger 
macroeconomic picture because productivity growth in other sectors will create wealth 
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that can be used to purchase these goods.  The challenges, Baumol argues in a 
retrospective piece, are to manage secondary effects (such as the differential 
consequences for the poor) and to deal with a larger share of the economy being managed 
by the government (Baumol, 1996). 
Basing its explanation for increases in expenditures in broad changes in the 
overall economy, the Baumol hypothesis is fundamentally a macroeconomic explanation.  
Indeed, Archibald and Feldman (2006) point out thate Baumol hypothesis represents 
another version of work in international economics by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson 
(1964).  This research demonstrates that the wealth of rich countries enables inhabitants 
of those countries to enjoy a higher standard of living due to the consumption of 
internationally tradable goods (e.g., automobiles) while goods produced with local labor 
(e.g., haircuts) are priced according to the local price level (and thus are more expensive 
in developed countries).  Archibald and Feldman (2007) compare higher education costs 
to 69 other product categories and find that: 
From 1930 to 2000 the average price of durable goods r se by a factor of 4.12, the 
average price of nondurable goods rose 8.24 times, and the average price of 
services rose 11.11 times…. [A]fter 1980 the prices of ervices that rely on highly 
educated labor (lawyers, physicians, and dentists) rise much more rapidly than the 
prices of services that rely on less well educated labor (domestic servants and 
barbers).  (p. 8) 
Archibald and Feldman (2007) suggest that there is an additional macroeconomic 
factor at work—“capital-skill complementarity”—that boosts the demand for highly 
skilled labor when capital is added to the production function.  Krusell, Ohanian, and 
Ríos-Rull (2000), for example, find that changes in capital-skill complementarity account 
for most of the post-war wage premium.  They point ou , however, that they are not 
intending to deny the agency of higher education leaders, merely that: “[o]ur analysis 
 15 
suggests that higher education decision makers are faced with choices that result in either 
rising costs or declining quality” (Archibald & Feldman, 2007, p. 21). 
THE BOWEN HYPOTHESIS: EXPENDITURES CONSTRAINED ONLY BY REVENUES 
An alternative explanation for increases in higher education expenditures above 
the general rise of prices in the economy is provided by H. R. Bowen (1980).  Bowen 
studied cross-sectional expenditure data from public and private institutions for a variety 
of institutions with different missions for the 1974- 5 academic year (a range of 
institutions, incidentally, that many later writers ignore in focusing on research 
universities).  He finds a great divergence in per-student expenditures at these 
universities, even between institutions with similar missions.  Bowen argues this 
divergence occurs because there is no external pressure enforcing standardized 
expenditures on these institutions and he locates th  lack of external pressure in low 
levels of competition due to geographic location and service differentiation.  Bowen  
concludes that what institutions categorize as needs “are arguments in favor of increased 
funding, not causes of increased costs” (H. R. Bowen, 1980, p. 16).  He also points out 
that efforts to increase efficiency will not reduce “ osts” but simply lead to a reallocation 
of spending.  In his view only reductions in revenu can lead to reduced expenditures. 
Accordingly he formulated what I will call for the purposed of this paper the 
“Bowen hypothesis” (also known as the “revenue theory of costs”).  This hypothesis 
places the blame for increases in expenditure not o factors in the macroeconomy (as the 
Baumol hypothesis asserts), but rather onto decisions made at the level of the institution 
and thus grounded in microeconomic factors.  This approach supports Bowen’s earlier 
assertion (1970) that: 
[o]ne might go further and say that the biggest facor determining cost per student 
is the income of the institutions.  The basic principle of college finance is very 
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simple.  Institutions raise as much money as they can get and spend it all.  Cost 
per student is therefore determined primarily by the amount of money that can be 
raised.  If more money is raised, costs will go up;if less is raised, costs will go 
down.  (p. 81) 
Bowen (1980) expanded this 1970 insight into five “laws” governing college 
budget decision-making: 
• the dominant goals of institutions are educational excellence, prestige, and 
influence; 
• there is virtually no limit to the amount of money an institution can spend for 
seemingly fruitful educational ends; 
• each institution raises all the money it can; 
• each institution spends all it raises; and 
• the cumulative effect of the preceding four laws is towards ever increasing 
expenditure.  (p. 19-20) 
Because there is no “law” that provides a natural microeconomic restraint on 
expenditures, large increases in college expenditures a e nothing more than the pursuit of 
educational excellence, prestige, and influence unrestrained by market discipline.  The 
“duty” of setting limits falls on those who provide the money—legislators and families 
(H. R. Bowen, 1980, p. 18).  One way of formalizing Bowen’s point is that, in contrast to 
economic entities with clearly defined production fu ctions, there is no direct correlation 
between inputs and outputs at the firm level in institutions of higher education (H. R. 
Bowen, 1980). 
It is tempting to see Bowen’s hypothesis as atheoretical because it appears to be 
specific to higher education.  Archibald and Feldman (2007), for example, refer to a 
collection of such approaches as having “tunnel vision” and argue that they are merely a 
“descriptive analysis of what is going on in higher education and higher education alone” 
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(p. 5).  Indeed, there have been researchers who have gr fted onto Bowen’s basic insight 
what amount to ad hoc, discipline-specific explanations.  For example, Massy and Wilger 
(1992) propose a five-factor explanatory model including both Baumol and Bowen 
hypotheses while adding on regulatory overhead, the growth of an administrative 
“lattice” created by administrative entrepreneurs, and an academic “ratchet” privileging 
research over teaching as professors realize their careers rely on validation external to the 
university. 
Getz and Siegfried (1991) argue that, from a social perspective, the problem of 
high expenditures is more important than the problem of high tuition and identify six 
broad points of view about why spending has increased.  They identify Baumol as one of 
the six and add two market-based explanations (competitive market pressures for students 
and increased prices of inputs), pursuit of prestig among administrators and faculty 
(similar to Bowen), the quality of administration, and increased regulatory overhead.  
Through statistical modeling they conclude that market discipline plays a large role in 
restraining expenditures and “limits the ability of faculty or administrators to capture the 
institutions” (p. 390).  They conclude that the impetus behind higher expenditures is 
higher demand and that institutions are “supplying a demonstrably higher quality service 
for a higher price” (p. 391).  Given that both demand and quality are increasing, they 
argue, it is no surprise that expenditures increase as well. 
Other researchers have, like Bowen, found similar viation in expenditures 
across institutions and attribute it to explanations also broadly grounded in 
microeconomics.  For example, Brinkman (1981) argues that increasing expenditures are 
due to institutions operating “within a range of accepted norms” in the absence of a clear 
production function (Brinkman, 1990, p. 110).  In that work, Brinkman proposes a four-
dimension model to explain expenditures: size, scope of services, level of instruction, and 
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discipline.  His model explains 60% to 75% of cost variations (p. xi).  Middaugh, 
Graham, and Shahid (2003) studied cost data by academic discipline in the Delaware 
Study and conclude that most of the variance in instructional cost at institutions is 
determined by disciplinary mix at the institution, with the institution’s Carnegie 
classification being of secondary importance.  Within-discipline variation across 
institutions is explained by volume of teaching activity, which exhibits economies of 
scale, while size of department, proportion of tenur d faculty, and presence of graduate 
instruction all increase expenditures.   
Martin (2011) argues that Bowen’s argument is not atheoretical and presents a 
behavioral framework to support the Bowen hypothesis.  There are three main elements 
in his behavioral framework.  First, the pursuit of prestige occurs because higher 
education is an “experience good”; consumers of the good determine its quality by 
“experiencing” it as opposed to testing various suppliers of the good through a search 
procedure (Nelson, 1970).  Visible displays of prestig —beautiful buildings, celebrated 
researchers, champion sports teams—signal to the consumer that the product they will 
purchase is of excellent quality.  Second, the constant activity of fund raising in higher 
education creates a principal-agent problem (Martin, 2011, p. 162).  A principal-agent 
problem can occur whenever one person hires another to perform a task and it reflects the 
differing incentives faced by each.  The problem is generally addressed through the use 
of incentives to align the interests of the agent with the principal (Lane & Kivisto, 2008).  
This is a non-trivial task, particularly when output is poorly measured and when there are 
multiple goals for the principal from the relationship (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991), 
both circumstances that describe higher education.  In particular, the persistent lack of 
information about the returns to instruction and the difficulty of identifying quality 
teaching exacerbates the principal-agent problem in the sector (Martin, 2012).  For elite 
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universities, large endowments also render the principal-agent problem more vexatious as 
they reduce the level of control principals may exert on agents (Martin, 2009). 
It is in the third of the three elements that Martin makes his most significant 
contribution by describing how the non-profit status of higher education institutions 
magnifies the principal-agent problem.  In a for-profit enterprise, there is a clear line of 
control from the property holder (principal) to the firm’s agents.  For example, a given 
fractional stock holding possessed by a principal represents that percentage of ownership 
in a firm.  In a non-profit, however, there is no discrete ownership interest among its 
principals, whose property rights are held in common.  Most important, however, is the 
fact that any financial residual produced by the non-profit is not distributed outside the 
firm (e.g., through dividends) but rather spent within the institution.  In other words, non-
profits spend these residual returns not on the principals who employ them but on the 
agents themselves.  Indeed, as Martin points out, it is a very small step for a university to 
assert that its principals (students, parents, and external funders) and its agents (faculty 
and staff) are equal “primary stakeholders” in the activities of the institution.  “This,” 
Martin (2011) argues, “is how chronic agency abuse becomes institutionalized” (p. 84). 
Agency abuse is always and everywhere linked to higher expenditures and is a 
general explanation for discrete observations of institutional behavior such as the “lattice 
and ratchet.”  This theoretical basis renders unnecessary explanations for increases in 
expenditures located in specific parts of the institution such as the “bureaucratic 
accretion” model posited by Gumport and Pusser (1995).  Addressing this agency abuse, 
Martin (2012) argues, requires a change at the “center mass” of the problem: the 
administrators and boards with expenditure authority and on whose watch spending on 
overhead has exploded while overhead in the wider economy has been aggressively 
reduced (p. 25). 
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DEFINING PRESTIGE 
Bowen and Martin both make clear that it is the search for prestige that drives the 
choices of higher educator officials in directing exp nditures.  One key aspect in 
determining institutional prestige is research—moving up the old Carnegie categorization 
from Research II to Research I, for example, has been used as an indicator for increasing 
prestige (O'Meara, 2007) and studies have attempted to xamine how spending patterns at 
universities shift upon reaching the higher designatio  (Morphew & Baker, 2004).  One 
less appreciated aspect of the linkage between research and prestige is that institutions 
that are heavily engaged in research should be analyzed as “multi-product firms,” as 
described by Cohn, Rhine, and Santos (1989).  (Simpler institutions focused on education 
can be analyzed in the more traditional fashion as a single-product enterprise.)  As a 
result, an analysis that attempts to determine the systemic factors driving spending in 
higher education cannot examine only high-prestige or high-prestige-seeking research 
universities because single-product, instruction-only institutions may demonstrate 
significant variation in expenditure patterns. 
There is also a potential link between tuition and research: tuition may be used to 
subsidize research not funded through external grants.  An analysis of the spending 
patterns at 96 public Research Extensive industries between 1984 and 2007 suggests that 
one tuition dollar leads to a five cent increase in research expenditures (Leslie, Slaughter, 
Taylor, & Zhang, 2011).  An econometric study by Heflin (2012) of all Carnegie-
identified research institutions suggests that cross-subsidization occurs at public 
institutions at the level of 16 cents per tuition dollar and that subsidization increased 
between 1999 and 2008. 
A second element in determining prestige is what Douglass and Keeling (2008) 
have called the “Pricing Equals Prestige Rule” (p. 4).  In the absence of objective 
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standards of measurable quality, consumers of higher education adopt a stance of “you 
get what you pay for” and use list price as an indication of quality.  This phenomenon, 
observed in the private sector for many years, may explain some of the impetus for 
tuition deregulation as one of the stated goals of the policy change was to ensure that the 
“list price” of Texas’ flagship universities was close to their public research peers in other 
states. 
The final element in the prestige chase among universiti s are the “customers” 
themselves—students are both outputs and inputs.  Better students create a virtuous 
circle.  Universities are willing to grant a higher subsidy to these students to improve 
their output quality by controlling their input quality; “[t]he bottom line for any school is 
that it is donative wealth that buys this quality” (Winston, 1999, p. 30).  For public 
institutions, lacking the large endowments of elite private institutions, even mild 
reductions in state appropriations can have the effect of significant reductions in what is 
effectively “donative wealth” Winston (1999, p. 37).  In an intriguing paper, Eisenkopf 
(2007) presents a theoretical argument that tuition deregulation may lead to universities 
increasing tuition to deter unwanted students—an effect that would have an obvious, 
positive effect on prestige. 
Institutions model themselves after each other, a behavior called “institutional 
isomorphism” by Reisman (1956).  Each institution carefully monitors its immediate 
superiors, its peers, and its challengers and reacts as hey react.  Through this mechanism, 
the behavior of the top institutions is transmitted through the entire sector.  Berdahl 
(1985) describes this as a tendency to copy prestige institutional behavior if unrestrained.  
Winston (2000) demonstrates in a stylized system that what institutions most closely 
monitor are “student subsidies”—the difference between the cost of the education and the 
price to the student—provided by their immediate competitors on the academic hierarchy.  
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He argues that there is a “positional arms race” where the best students choose the 
highest subsidy possible.  Any degradation of the subsidy relative to the immediate peers 
of an institution has a high likelihood of degrading the quality of student attending the 
institution.  Tuition deregulation enables institutions to increase this subsidy to favored 
students by extracting higher payments from less favored students. 
COMPARISON OF THE HYPOTHESES 
As with many cases of mutually conflicting theoretical possibilities, 
understanding university expenditures involves a mixture of competing explanations.  
Even one of the architects of the Baumol hypothesis, for example, acknowledges that the 
Bowen hypothesis must contain a kernel of truth—that competitive pressures are “an 
undeniable source of upwards pressure on costs” (W. G. Bowen, 2012, p. 8).  
Lingenfelter (2006) points out that, even adjusting with a specific price index for higher 
education (which presumably would neutralize the “cost disease” of the Baumol 
hypothesis), the “unit cost” of education is still increasing and this is explained by the 
competitive pressures embedded within the Bowen hypot esis. 
One challenge to the Baumol hypothesis involves thelarge growth in 
expenditures on college administration, a point made by H. R. Bowen himself: “[A] 
strong case can be made that economies should be sought in the nonacademic part of 
institutional budgets rather than then academic part” (1980, p. 151).  Recall that the 
fundamental insight of the Baumol hypothesis is that e “performer” in a labor-intensive 
task faces certain immutable barriers to productivity.  Static productivity simply cannot 
address why institutions choose to hire an ever-growing number of additional, highly 
educated, talented people who are not providing instruction or research.  Strein and 
McMahon (1979), for example, argue that administrative expenses in a university system 
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are a function of discretionary revenue and found that “lower quality, local in scope, 
Ph.D. producing institutions show a strong, statistically significant administrative 
expense problem” (p. 21). 
In an extensively cited article, Triplett and Bosworth (2003) examined multifactor 
productivity in Bureau of Labor Statistics two-digit service industries after 1995 and find 
that these industries display remarkable productivity growth during the period.  They 
open the possibility that measured lower rates of pr ductivity prior to 1995 could be 
related to technical limitations in the measurement of labor productivity for these sectors 
and conclude that perhaps “the cure for Baumol’s Disease was found years ago, only the 
statistics did not record it.  Or perhaps the servic s industries were never sick, it was 
just…that the measuring thermometer was wrong” (p. 30)
Harter, Wade, and Watkins (2005) find that the largest determinant of the growth 
in real expenditures per student at public institutions is the growth in average real faculty 
salaries, a labor market where they compete directly for talent (and prestige) with private 
institutions.  This finding is consistent with the Bowen hypothesis.  In contrast, in an 
investigation of 67 industries from 1948 to 2001, Nordhaus (2008) finds that “[i]ndustries 
with relatively lower productivity growth show a perc ntage-point for percentage-point 
higher growth in relative prices,” exactly what the Baumol hypothesis (p. 10) would 
predict. 
PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES AND EXTERNAL COST CONTROL  
Breneman (2001) argues that the Bowen hypothesis applies with particular 
force—and may be measured empirically—at public universities (p. 16).  Private 
universities either draw enough revenues to cover th i  actual cost of doing business or 
close; elite private sector institutions neither raise all they can nor spend all they raise.  
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Johnstone (2001) argues that it is only the public se tor where university expenditures 
“are legitimately a public policy issue” (p. 29) and concludes that there is little evidence 
of “out-of-control costs” (p. 38).  Jones (2001) points out that existing national research 
ignores the role in public institutional governance played by states, arguing that: 
[i]f Howard Bowen’s revenue theory of cost has merit and if states wield policy 
influence to a degree commensurate with their share of institutional support, 
analysis of state funding and influence on tuition levels and affordability becomes 
the obvious starting point in the search for information that has utility for federal 
policymakers.  (p. 54) 
Martin (2012) contends that public institution budgets are in direct competition 
with other state services and this competition (along with the direct control of the 
institutions by public boards) enables public institutions to be better equipped to address 
the principal-agent conflict and restrain costs.  Ehrenberg (2000) echoes this argument 
saying that there is: 
a fundamental difference between the governance of public and private 
institutions that makes it much easier for the public institutions to hold down their 
costs. Boards of trustees at public universities anwer to the executive and 
legislative branches of state government. In contrast, in the short run boards of 
trustees at private universities answer directly onl  to themselves. (p. 24) 
Leslie et al. (2011)  describe significant differenc s between public and private 
higher education institutions; however, they find that private institution spending patterns 
match the Bowen hypothesis more closely than public institutions. 
TUITION DEREGULATION IN TEXAS—A NATURAL EXPERIMENT  
To date, no comprehensive history of the deregulation of tuition in Texas has been 
published.  The existing research that has dealt with the policy change generally asserts 
that there was a quid pro quo of deregulation in exchange for lower state appropriations 
(Hernandez, 2009).  While not entirely incorrect, the true story is more interesting and 
leads to valuable insights into how higher education leaders view the importance of 
 25 
increasing expenditures.  This study now turns to a brief legislative history of tuition 
deregulation, using contemporary documentation, to sti ch together a narrative of events 
leading to the policy change. 
Public higher education institutions in the United States historically attempted to 
ensure broad access to higher education through strict tate regulation of low tuition and 
fees (Hauptman, 2001).  Prior to tuition deregulation this was the policy in Texas, where 
tuition was set by statute at a low per-credit hour amount and any proposed fee by a 
university required statutory authorization from the Legislature. 
In 1995, the Legislature authorized a “Stair Step” plan to create regular, moderate, 
predicable increases in tuition and fees.  These increases, however, were seen as 
insufficient to meet the (perceived) needs of universiti s, particularly universities such as 
the University of Texas at Austin (UT Austin), whic had aspirations to increased 
national prominence.  When the step increase plan ended, the University of Texas System 
(UT System) began to work towards a different strategy.  In the summer of 2000, system 
officials first developed a new plan to meet the financial needs of the university—the 
removal of the state tuition cap.  As part of prepaing the system’s budget request for the 
77th Texas Legislature Charles Miller (Regent of the UTSystem) presented the first 
formal proposal for tuition deregulation in Texas, cast in terms of a general approach to 
deregulation across government “[t]here's just no reason we shouldn't have that in higher 
education too” (Badgley, 2000b). 
The initial UT System proposal was to eliminate both minimum and maximum 
tuition regulations in statute and this drew criticism from some members of the Texas 
Legislature who feared it would price some students out of higher education.  Regent 
Miller downplayed the concerns, arguing that deregulation was needed to decrease 
management inefficiency and that “[t]his does not imply any significant rise in tuition 
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and fees” (Badgley, 2000a).  He argued that there would be little effect on needy students 
since more than 50% of the increase would be put into f ancial aid. 
By September 2000, the UT System had developed a formal proposal for the 
upcoming session and presented it to the House Committee on Higher Education.  This 
proposal was described by UT Austin President Larry Faulkner as the “Flex Plan.”  
Included in the plan was a second option to charge  flat tuition fee for undergraduate 
students taking between 12 and 18 hours.  UT System Chancellor R. D. Burck insisted 
that the universities needed flexibility to react to inflation and other unforeseen costs and 
that “[t]his does not necessarily mean that fees would increase but it could” (Bello, 2000).  
Representative Henry Cuellar, vice-chair of the Committee proposed a new extension of 
the previous Stair Step increase to statutory tuition and raised the specter of the effect of 
deregulation on middle class students if tuition deregulation were to pass. 
As the 77th Legislative Session opened, Chancellor Burck wrote an editorial 
laying out the case for deregulation more generally.  He argued that universities were 
burdened with unnecessary rules and that these rules limited the ability of institutions to 
respond quickly to change.  The proposed tuition deregulation, however, went 
unmentioned (Burck, 2001).  In the end, the 77th Legislature took no action on tuition 
deregulation and instead renewed the Stair Step plan by adding $2 per semester credit 
hour for each of the next five years and $1 per semester credit hour for another five years 
beyond that, extending the approach through the 2011- 2 academic year (Stone, 2001). 
This renewed Stair Step plan did not signal a stable bargain.  On February 8, 
2002, the UT Austin Board of Regents unilaterally authorized a large fee increase 
designed to repair aging buildings: $150 per semester initially, rising to $860 per 
semester in five years.  At issue were two bills from the 77th Session: House Bill 658 
(2001), which proposed construction bond money, and an amendment to Senate Bill 1759 
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(2001), which dealt with regulations concerning public securities.  Officials at UT Austin 
argued that the changes made by the bills to a (seemingly) obsolete building fee statute 
gave them the authority to implement the new building fee even though no explicit 
statutory authority to impose this new fee was granted during the session.  Commissioner 
of Higher Education Don Brown testified in February 2002 that if the UT Austin 
interpretation was correct the Legislature had “deregulated control over charges to 
students” to the universities and that he disagreed with the interpretation (Nissimov, 
2002).  In July 2002, Attorney General John Cornyn agreed with Commissioner Brown 
and the building fee was put on hold. 
In addition to the backdoor tuition deregulation effort UT Austin pursued under 
the guise of the building use fee increase, in spring 2002 the UT System began preparing 
for a frontal assault intended to deregulate tuition f rmally.  At a UT System meeting in 
Port Aransas in April the System regents and univers ty presidents discussed the 
importance of a unified front in pursuing deregulation during the upcoming 78th 
Legislature (Mock, 2002).  A September 2002 editorial is the first public hint at two new 
arguments for tuition deregulation—that allowing UT Austin and Texas A&M to set 
tuition would reflect the higher value of their degr es as well as give them additional 
funds to shore up their flagging flagship reputations (Lowery, 2002). 
The 2002 state elections led to dramatic changes in Texas politics in the 78th 
Legislative Session as the Republicans took control of the House of Representatives for 
the first time since Reconstruction.  The removal of Irma Rangel as the chair of the 
House Committee on Higher Education also removed a key institutional barrier to 
passage of tuition deregulation.  Presumed Speaker of the House Tom Craddick said that 
the Legislature setting tuition at universities was “ridiculous” and that the various Boards 
of Regents should have that power (Jayson, 2002b).  Mark Yudof, the incoming 
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Chancellor of the UT System, signaled a clear desire to push for sweeping tuition 
deregulation, citing the need to maintain top tier status along with encouraging students 
to graduate more quickly.  Even with the political wind at his back, however, Yudof 
hinted at the possibility of some tuition being lowered “to encourage students to take 
classes in the afternoon” (Elliott, 2002b). 
The final report of the Joint Interim Committee on Higher Education Funding 
recommended only very limited tuition deregulation (for summer classes and out-of-state 
students) with Senate Finance Committee Chair Steve Ogden saying “I’m opposed to the 
idea that our state institutions of higher education are really quasi-private and should 
charge what the traffic will bear.”  Chancellor Yudof denied that there were specific 
plans to raise tuition and pointed out that states that deregulated tuition have tuition 
“about $1,000 a year” higher than UT Austin’s $4,000 (Elliott, 2002a).  In addition, 
Yudof unveiled a proposal that students with income under $41,000 could send their 
children to any University of Texas campus free if tuition deregulation were passed 
(Jayson, 2002a). 
Beyond the boost given to tuition deregulation by the switch of power in the 
House of Representatives, a second, and perhaps more i portant, process was playing 
out: the state was in its greatest budget crisis since the dark days of the savings and loan 
disaster of 1984-1985 and faced a massive deficit of $10 billion for the upcoming 
biennium.  State agencies, including universities, were instructed to implement an 
immediate reduction of 7% from their previous biennial appropriation (Lim, 2003).  The 
challenge of dealing with the budget shortfall was further compounded by Governor Rick 
Perry’s insistence that no new taxes be passed.  A major part of Governor Perry’s plan to 
deal with the budget gap by cutting spending was allowing tuition deregulation to make 
up for the difference at universities (Herman, 2003). Chancellor Yudof estimated that 
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tuition and fees could increase “as much as 27 percent over five years” if tuition 
deregulation were put into place (Jayson, 2003b).   
These grim budget realities initially seemed to persuade legislators that tuition 
deregulation would need to be a part of any final appropriation level for higher education.  
Representative Fred Brown, member of the House Higher Education Committee, 
conceded that “deregulating tuition is likely to be the only answer to our budget 
constraints” while the Senate Education Committee Chair Florence Shapiro said that “[t]o 
put large amounts of money into higher education is ot an option.”  At the same time, 
the reality that the external pressure for tuition deregulation was being driven by UT 
Austin and the UT System became clear, with Howard G aves, Chancellor of the A&M 
System, and Lee Jackson, Chancellor of the North Texas System, both opposing the basic 
bargain of trading appropriations for autonomy (Kay & Jayson, 2003).  President 
Faulkner then issued a threat to resurrect the building fee as an option if tuition 
deregulation was not passed (Jayson, 2003a). 
In March, Senator Shapiro and Representative Geanie Morrison (Chair of the 
House Higher Education Committee) filed Senate Bill 1542 (2003) and House Bill 3015 
(2003), after the chancellors of the other state university systems switched their position 
on tuition deregulation (Benton, 2003).  By early April, however, the Senate bill no 
longer included the tuition deregulation provisions (since Senator Shapiro’s approach to 
link tuition increases to tuition increases in other states was found to be unworkable), 
replaced with a straight $12 per credit hour increase in statutory tuition.  On the House 
side, a variation of the Yudof plan for low-income students was linked with tuition 
deregulation (Kay, 2003b).  The Senate bill passed out of committee on April 22, while a 
final compromise on the House measure, a $23 per credit hour increase for each of two 
years followed by deregulation beginning with the 2005-06 school year and tuition set 
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asides for students with financial need, enabled HB 3015 to be passed out of committee 
on April 23 (Drosjack, 2003).  A week later, the House passed HB 3015 but limited 
tuition deregulation to a one-time change in 2005, with future increases requiring that 
universities fulfill conditions mandated by the Coordinating Board (Kay, 2003a). 
There the measures stood for almost a month.  As of May 21, when the Senate 
Education Committee voted out HB 3015, Senator Shapiro roclaimed “[t]here’s no 
semblance of deregulation left.”  Plans were made for interim studies (the classic solution 
for a high-profile, failed Legislative initiative) and President Faulkner appeared to 
concede defeat, saying “We’ll be able to manage the biennium with this bill” (Kay, 
2003c). 
Five days later, everything changed.   
The drama of the Legislative session in Texas is the down-to-the-wire completion 
of the appropriation bill; at some level everything else is but a sideshow.  And while the 
sideshow of the tuition deregulation bills was grinding away, Speaker Craddick had one 
final card to play—the Senate version of the appropriation bill contained $500 million 
more in funding for higher education than the House version.  He gave Senators a stark 
choice: full, complete, and immediate tuition deregulation or accepting the lower House 
amount for higher education formula funding.  Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst 
agreed to the deal and on June 1 (a day before the nd of the session) both chambers 
suspended their rules and passed complete tuition deregulation (Harmon & Kay, 2003). 
Despite assurances to the contrary during the Legislative debate, universities 
responded to the new freedom by implementing large tuition increases, with average fall 
semester student tuition at four-year institutions i creasing 72% over the next seven 
years, from $1,934 in 2003 to $3,323 in 2009 (Texas Higher Education Coordinating 
Board, 2010).  The amount of legislative activity that university leadership engaged in to 
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achieve this goal is reflected in the results of a survey of legislators following the 2003 
session, which found that only 64% of legislators thought that Texas public university 
leadership complied with state laws against lobbying by government agencies (Wolf, 
2004, p. 89).  In his 2004 State of the School speech, Faulkner (2004) gave explanations 
of what the UT Austin did with the additional funds from tuition that suggest both Bowen 
and Baumol effects played a role—“faculty expansion”  the one hand and a three 
percent across the board raise on the other. 
SUMMARY  
There are two major lessons to take away from the legislative history of tuition 
deregulation in Texas.  First, given the wide variety of explanations made by University 
of Texas officials on why tuition deregulation was necessary, there is no simple and clear 
stated justification to be tested.  Rather the diversity of rationales provided by Chancellor 
Yudof and others suggest that the University and the System were willing to make 
virtually any case—even contradictory cases—if thatargument led to a tactical advantage 
at a given point in time.  In other words, the actul reason for the initiative cannot be 
determined from contemporary public pronouncements. All that can be ascertiained is 
that UT Austin and UT System leadership at the highest level felt increasing expenditures 
was of critical importance. 
Second, while remaining catholic on the virtues of the approach chosen by the 
Legislature, for the purposes of social science resarch the complete switch from rigid 
regulation to complete deregulation provides an excellent “natural experiment” to test 
any number of propositions related to the finance of public higher education.  Such an 
approach has been used in the past to examine changes i  tuition policy.  For example, 
Hübner (2012) examines the change in enrollment likelihood in German states 
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introducing student charges following a constitutional court ruling that repealed the 
national ban on tuition and fees.  Swail and Heller (2004) assess cross-national price 
sensitivity using natural experiments enabled by tuition policy changes in ten 
jurisdictions across five countries.  Frenette (2005) measures the effect on enrollment of 
tuition deregulation in undergraduate professional programs in Canada.  These studies 
reflect the first understanding of “student cost” described earlier (out-of-pocket expenses 
to access higher education) and measure how student behavior is affected by tuition 
policy changes.  A similar study could be done for tuition deregulation in Texas.  For 
example, Hernandez (2009) compares enrollment trends pre- and post-deregulation with 
particular emphasis on Hispanic students and institutions in the border regions. 
These natural experiments, however, can also be used to investigate choices made 
by decision makers at universities about where to spend these substantial increases in 
funding from tuition revenues.  In the Texas case, tuition deregulation did not simply lead 
to a distributional change, with students picking up a share of the cost previously covered 
by the state while the net budgets of institutions remained static.  Rather, because it led to 
an overall increase in expenditures, it provides a test for both the Baumol and the Bowen 
theoretical hypotheses.  To the extent that the Baumol hypothesis explains marginal 
behavior changes, we should expect to see the largeincr ases in new revenue from 
tuition being used to compensate for wages across the institution that were low relative to 
prevailing market wages.  To the extent that the Bowen hypothesis explains these 
changes, however, we should expect to see labor expenses at the institution increase in a 
concentrated fashion and in a manner designed to enhance the perceived values of 
educational excellence, prestige, and influence. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
Chapter 3 details the analytical approach used in this research.  After reiterating 
the problem statement and research questions it briefly reviews the paradigm of 
econometrics and relates this research paradigm to the theoretical discussion from 
Chapter 2.  Next, it describes the econometric design employed in this study, its source of 
data, the population examined, and defines the variables used in the analysis.  It then 
details the econometric apparatus of the research along with the instruments included in 
that apparatus.  Finally, it presents the functional form of the econometric model. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
National per student spending at public, four-year institutions increased rapidly in 
the last three decades and dramatic increases in the real level of tuition paid by students 
provided much of the additional revenue that allowed this increase in spending.  This 
study uses the Texas case to determine how universit es allocated expenditures following 
tuition deregulation.  Were these expenditures constrai ed by macroeconomic factors in 
the general labor market (the Baumol hypothesis) or do unresolved agency problems, the 
pursuit of institutional interests, and other microec nomic explanations instead explain 
expenditures (the Bowen hypothesis).  This study answers two research questions: 
Question 1: To what degree do the competing Baumol and Bowen hypotheses 
explain expenditure changes at public four-year institutions of higher education? 
Question 2: Do public, four-year institutions of higher education with 
strongly defined research missions exhibit different choices in expending these new 
funds? 
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THEORETICAL PARADIGM  
This research is situated in the theoretical paradigm of econometrics.  Greene 
(2010) quotes Ragnar Frisch (founding editor of thejournal Econometrica) that the 
purpose of econometrics is the “unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the 
empirical-quantitative approach to economic problems and [is] penetrated by the 
constructive and rigorous thinking to that which has come to dominate the natural 
sciences” (p. 1).  Econometrics is not simply “the application of mathematics to 
economics.”  Rather, Green states, econometrics “concerns itself with the application of 
mathematical statistics and the tools of statistical inference to the empirical measurement 
of relationships postulated by an underlying theory” (p. 2).  It is worth teasing out the 
elements of this definition. 
First, the econometric approach involves explicit linking of theory and 
measurement.  It is not simply a recitation of economic statistics unmoored from 
explanation (e.g., a report of industrial statistics).  Nor does the econometrician have the 
luxury of being able to define explanatory factors and construct a model linking them 
through stylized facts  in ceteris paribus fashion (as a theoretical economist might).  
Linking theory and empiricism inevitably leads to real world relationships that are 
confounded by exogenous complexities.  As a result, econometric models seek to 
replicate the ceteris paribus assumption of theoretical economics through the us of 
control variables and other statistical techniques that isolate the theoretical relationship of 
interest. 
Second, variables included in econometric models should have a logical, causal, 
theoretical basis.  In other words, developing an econometric model is not a data mining 
exercise in search of some largest possible explanatory statistic.  “Surprising” variables 
that have putatively significant correlations but have not been previously identified as 
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potentially causal should be treated with caution and approaches that create the 
possibility of spurious correlations (e.g., stepwise regression of dozens of potential 
independent variables) should be avoided. 
Finally, the approach is unapologetically quantitative and empirical and as a result 
must use imperfect indicator variables to represent u derlying theoretical factors.  
Econometric modelers are rarely able to create variables for measurement and thus 
cannot design indicators that replicate as closely as possible the factor under 
investigation.  Rather, modelers are generally presented with a set of existing measures.  
The person constructing the model must apply subject matter expertise to select the 
indicator variables that are the best possible fit for he underlying factors.  In other words, 
variables in econometric studies often represent a satisficing approach that measures the 
underlying factor with some (perhaps substantial) degree of imprecision.  The toolbox of 
econometrics is designed to deal with this imprecision. 
As Chapter 2 of the study explained, there are two major theoretical explanations 
for expenditures in higher education.  The first of hese, the Baumol hypothesis, contends 
that higher education is labor intensive and that, like other labor intensive industries, it is 
largely resistant to increasing output through productivity gains.  Sectors in the general 
economy with production functions that can generate productivity gains will be able to 
distribute a portion of those productivity gains to labor while at the same time competing 
with labor-intensive sectors in the labor market.  As a result, sectors that cannot capture 
productivity gains are subject to a “cost disease” that renders their goods and services 
more expensive to produce relative to the price levl of the overall economy over time.  
The classic case of this cost disease is the producti n of artistic goods (e.g. symphonies). 
In contrast, the Bowen hypothesis suggests that non-pr fit firms are subject to 
principal-agent problems.  Lacking the discipline of a market and with principals (clients) 
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only tenuously related to the decision making of the firm, these organizations are 
motivated to “raise all they can and spend all they raise” with additional revenue 
distributed to parts of the firm favored by those making budgeting choices.  This constant 
erosion of self-interested agent behavior degrades productivity and, over time, increases 
costs for services produced by the firm.  In higher education the accumulation of 
additional administration positions, reductions in faculty teaching load, and prestige 
seeking are potential results of principal-agent problems. 
Martin and Hill (2012) describe an econometric methodology to test the relative 
scale of Baumol and Bowen cost effects.  They examined Carnegie I and II public 
research institutions from 1987 until 2008 and found evidence for both Baumol and 
Bowen effects, with Bowen effects over twice as large as Baumol effects.  Their model 
suggests that these Bowen effects arise due to an increase in administrative costs and are 
a result of weak shared governance at these institutions. 
While exceptionally creative, Martin and Hill’s work has a number of limitations.  
First, it focuses on research universities and does not examine how Baumol and Bowen 
effects manifest themselves at other types of institutions (or even between top top-tier 
research institutions and institutions below these rarified heights).  Second, their data is 
national (although they control for two regions) and as a result state-level policy changes 
such as tuition deregulation in Texas are both unlikely to be visible and degrade the 
predictive power of their model.  Third, their data set uses expenditure records from as 
far back as 1989.  Unfortunately, these early records were compiled using a different 
accounting standard than the current GASB 34 financial reporting framework and the fit 
between measurement categories in the two systems is imperfect at best.  The remainder 
of this chapter describes the Martin and Hill approach in more detail and how I adapted 
their model to answer the two research questions posed at the beginning of this chapter. 
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PROCEDURE 
This study presents an econometric model that links expenditures incurred at 
higher education institutions with variables designed to measure the relative effects of the 
competing Baumol and Bowen hypotheses.  Institutional mission is presumed to have an 
effect on spending decisions and as a result the model controls for institutional type (and 
this control allows the model to answer the second f the research questions).  Because 
the analysis uses time series data, the model controls for changes that occurred due to 
shifts in the overall environment by fiscal year and this allows for the investigation of the 
effects of tuition deregulation in Texas. 
DESIGN 
This study presents five sets of regression results: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
and four extensions of this approach often labeled as “robust regression.”  These 
extensions are designed to address data structures that do not conform to the strict 
assumptions of OLS.  The five regressions link total expenditures to theoretical and 
control variables from the literature of higher education economics, as specified in the 
Martin and Hill methodology.  These robust regression techniques are described below. 
SOURCE OF DATA  
All financial and staffing data for this project are taken from the public Integrated 
Postsecondary Educational Data System (IPEDS) operated by the National Center for 
Educational Statistics (NCES).  All data was recorded under GASB 34 accounting 
standards.  The dataset is in the form of a balanced panel. 
SUBJECTS/POPULATION  
The initial selection criteria I used in querying the IPEDS database was all Texas 
public institutions offering four-year bachelor degr es from fiscal years 2003 through 
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2011 (nine years).  Following this initial selection, three community colleges offering 
Bachelor of Applied Technology degrees were eliminated from the study population as 
were Health-Related Institutions that perform limited undergraduate education.  This 
selection procedure left a total of 34 public, four-year institutions and a potential 306 
degrees of freedom, more than sufficient for the number of variables contemplated for the 
regression model.  One of these institutions (Sam Houston State University) had to be 
excluded as it did not report GASB 34 compliant cost data for fiscal year 2003 and 
including the institution would have required using methods for unbalanced panel data.  
A second institution (the University of Texas at Brownsville) was excluded due to its 
unique financial arrangement with the local community college district.  As a result, 32 
institutions, with 288 degrees of freedom, represent the study population. 
VARIABLES  
The study replicates, as closely as possible, the definitions Martin and Hill (2012) 
use to construct variables.  I report variations from their approach (either due to different 
circumstances in Texas or ambiguities in their repoted methodology) below.   All 
variable names use Martin and Hill’s naming convention. 
Dependent Variable. 
Martin and Hill define three variables to measure expenditures—academic costs 
(instruction, research, and public service), overhead costs (academic support, student 
services, institutional support, auxiliaries, and iependent operations), and total cost (tc) 
the summation of the first two.  While they construc  regression models for all three types 
of expenditures, their analysis is limited to the total cost variable.  This is 
understandable—IPEDS only imperfectly separates staffing measurements by categories 
that can be divided into academic and non-academic expenditures.  In this study all 
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modeling was conducted on the total cost dependent variable only.  This variable is 
reported on a per FTE student basis by dividing total institutional expenditures by the 
FTE student (ftestu) independent variable described below. 
Martin and Hill use a “real” total cost variable intheir model—that is, the 
nominal dollars reported in IPEDS are adjusted to 2008 dollars using the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI).  It is unclear when the inflation adjustment is made in their approach.  In 
this study I chose to model using nominal dollar value and to transform these results to 
2011 dollars using the CPI calibrated for the Texas fiscal year when calculating the 
results of the model.  (Note that Chapter 4 presents real dollar values for these 
independent variables for analytical purposes.) 
Independent Variables—Enrollments. 
The next set of variables Martin and Hill define measure students at the higher 
education institution.  (The authors do not specify the exact IPEDS field for these 
variables; in this study all counts refer to fall enrollment or employment figures.)  The 
following variables are included for each institution/year in this study: 
• FTE students (ftestu); 
• Full-time undergraduate students (ftug); 
• Full-time graduate students (ftgrad); and 
• Part-time students (ptstu). 
Independent Variables—Salaries and Benefits. 
The model uses two measures of compensation: staff alaries (staffsal) and 
employee benefits (benstaff).  These variables are constructed by adding wages nd 
benefits across all expenditure categories, respectively, and dividing by the total number 
of FTE staff at the institution (detailed below).  One critical element of Martin and Hill’s 
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method determines how these salaries should be allocated between Baumol and Bowen 
effects.  The fundamental argument of the Baumol hypothesis is that “productivity is 
constant and that salaries are driven by external market conditions” (p. 22).  Assuming a 
competitive labor market, it follows that changes in salaries and benefits unrelated to 
changes in staffing patterns at a firm must be due to macroeconomic causes. 
Martin and Hill conduct a “correlation analysis” using the staffsal and benstaff 
variables to determine the proportion of each that can be related to staffing variables.  
They find that 48% and 49% of the variation in salary nd benefits, respectively, could be 
explained by these variations (p. 23).  Accordingly, they assign the remainders (52% and 
51%) to the Baumol hypothesis but point out that this may overestimate the proportion of 
compensation the Baumol hypothesis explains if the correlation is incompletely specified. 
In this study, rather than use a simple correlation, I construct two OLS models to 
link salary and benefits to the staffing variables included in the dataset.  I then use the 
adjusted R2 for these models to determine the proportion of compensation expenses that 
can be explained by microeconomic staffing changes and assign this value to the Bowen 
hypothesis.  The remainders for the compensation variables are then assumed to be 
explained by macroeconomic factors and are assigned to the Baumol hypothesis. 
Independent Variables—Faculty Measurements. 
The FTE student measure ftestu is used to construct four of the five faculty 
measurements describing the contract status of academic employees: 
• Contract faculty per 100 FTE students (cf); 
• Part-time faculty per 100 FTE students (ptf); 
• FTE Faculty per 100 FTE students (ftef);  
• Teaching assistants per 100 FTE students (ta); and 
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• Ratio of tenure-track faculty to non-academic professional employment (ttad) 
(taken from the count of FTE executive/managerial employees and professional 
employees described below). 
Independent Variables—Staff Measurements. 
The next set of variables Martin and Hill define categorize the non-instructional 
staff at the institution: 
• FTE non-professional employees per 100 FTE students (ftenpro); 
• FTE executive and professional employees per 100 FTE students (fteadmin); 
• Average number of reporting employees per executive (staffsize);3 
• Part-time administrators per 100 FTE students (p admin); and 
• Part-time non-professional staff per 100 FTE students (ptnpro). 
Independent Variables—Revenues. 
A key prediction from the Bowen hypothesis is that igher revenues drive higher 
costs.  To measure these expenditures, Martin and Hill construct the following variables: 
• Operating revenue per FTE student (rev); 
• All “other” operating revenue per FTE student, a subset of operating revenue 
(other); and 
• Investment income per FTE student (i vest).4 
Independent Variables—Fixed Effects and Controls. 
Martin and Hill accomplish control of institutional variation by restricting their 
study to Research I and Research II institutions as well as including additional nominal 
                                                
3 The text is unclear on this variable; I include both executive and professional non-instructional employees 
in the count. 
4 Martin and Hill also use hospital revenue per FTE student.  As no Texas institutions in this study had
hospitals during the timeframe of the study I have eliminated this variable. 
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variables for institutions based upon Research I statu , three location codes (New 
England, Great Lakes, and far-west location), STEM focus, possessing a medical school, 
and possessing professional school(s).  Rather that eplicate their variables, inappropriate 
for a population of schools restricted to Texas andthat includes lower-level institutions, 
this study uses the five Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB) institution 
type ratings (Research, Emerging Research, Doctoral, Comprehensive, and Master’s) to 
distinguish the categories of public universities in Texas as fixed effect variables.5 
In addition to the control for THECB institution type, each record contains a fixed 
effect variable for the time period of the observation (since there was clearly substantial 
policy variation by year due to the exogenous shock of tuition deregulation).  Thus the 
two control variables for the study are control variables for the type of institution (I1…I5) 
and a fixed-effect variable for each time period (T2003…T2011). 
APPARATUS, INSTRUMENTS, PROTOCOLS 
The econometric model used to relate total costs (tc) to explanatory and control 
variables is the apparatus used in this research.  Within that overall apparatus, individual 
instruments measure relationships of interest by using the technique of “partial 
differentials” in which portions of the overall model are set to a value of zero.  The 
remaining estimated value measures the overall effect of the non-zero variables.  This 
study reports THECB institution type averages by calcul ting average values by type for 
each variable in the model.  The regression parameter estimates are multiplied by these 
average values to create estimates of explained expenditures by instrument for each 
instrument.  Finally, a CPI multiplier is used to convert the results to 2011 dollars. 
                                                
5 Note that some of these ratings are essentially aspirational in nature (e.g., the University of Texas at El 
Paso and the University of Dallas are considered th same type of Emerging Research institution).  In 
general, however, THECB institution types are objectiv ly determined and track the research and graduate 
study intensity of Texas public universities. 
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The protocols for this approach are those established in the literature to ensure 
that the assumptions of OLS regression are met: tha functional form is correctly 
specified, variances are constant, values of the dep ndent variable are independent, there 
is no autocorrelation of values (reduced independence over time) and the population is 
normally distributed (Bowerman & O'Connell, 1993, pp. 153-154).  Correct functional 
form is established through the theory underlying the included variables and investigating 
potential non-linear relationships during the modeling process through transformations of 
dependent and independent variables.  Independence is checked though investigation of 
multicollinearity: in this study through the use of Variance Inflation Factor, a variable 
clustering procedure to identify underlying factors in the data matrix, and a reduced 
variable version of the model constructed using the least absolute shrinkage and selection 
operator (LASSO) (Tibshirani, 1996). 
Robust Regression Techniques. 
Regression equations solved using OLS can be shown under the Gauss-Markov 
Theorem to be BLUE—Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (where “best” means lowest 
variance of the estimate).  This study presents an OLS model generated using the PROC 
GLMSELECT command in SAS.  Unfortunately, the assumptions required for OLS 
estimates to be BLUE are rigorous and under real-wor d conditions are rarely met, 
particularly for balanced panel data structures (Peters n, 2009).  OLS parameter estimates 
are sensitive to outliers with high leverage and even a small number of these outliers can 
skew parameter estimates.  In addition to biased parameter estimates that can be 
generated through influential outliers, OLS models can report false, low standard errors 
when the data structure displays non-constant variance (Petersen, 2009, p. 443) a 
condition known as heteroscedasticity.  Finally, time series data is often observed to 
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violate the independence assumptions of OLS because of autocorrelation—sequential and 
predictable variation in the observations (e.g., seasonality trends).  (Note that correcting 
sources of heteroscedasticity also corrects for the final OLS requirement that residual 
error terms be normally distributed.) 
Deviations from the Gauss-Markov assumption of homoscedasticity can be partly 
addressed through changes to the residual structure that modify the standard errors 
reported by the procedure (generally upwards) without changing the mean value 
parameter estimates OLS provides.  These adjusted stan ard errors are estimated using 
either heteroscedasticity consistent (HC) or heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC) estimators. 
In the OLS equation, variance is equal to the sum of the squared residual terms.  
The insight behind HC adjusted errors is that squared residual terms carry with them a 
constant weight of one.  White (1980) developed both the first general test for 
determining the presence of heteroscedasticity as well as the first HC procedure which 
could correct for it in an OLS solution (prior to his work the structure of the 
heteroscedasticity had to be known before it could be corrected).  When a data structure 
is homoscedastic, the covariance matrix it generates is diagonal.  White’s insight was that 
heteroscedasticity is a variation from this diagonal m trix structure and that it can be 
corrected for by assigning differential weights to the residuals exhibiting 
heteroscedasticity that would pull them back to the diagonal vector.  Since White, a 
number of HC estimators have been developed to deal with inefficiency in small sample 
sizes in the White estimator.  For a review of these see Zeileis (2004). 
The HAC estimator is an extension of the HC estimator nd was developed by 
Newey and West (1987) to correct for autocorrelation in time series datasets.  Their 
discovery was that a computationally simple secondary weight based on time distance 
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from an existing observation could be used to reduc the proportion of information 
falsely assigned by OLS to serially-correlated observations.  They accomplished this by 
defining a linear reduction as shown in Equation 1: 
 






m = maximum lag distance (specified by the modeler); and 
j = lag distance of the observation. 
The Newey West estimator requires that the modeler sp cify a lag period during 
which autocorrelation might occur.  Specifying a lag value of 1 corrects for first order 
autocorrelation (AR1), when the observation of the immediately preceding period is 
correlated with the current observation.  Higher lag v lues are used to correct for trends 
that vary by time period.  Common lag values used are 4, 8, and 12 to adjust for the 
quarterly reporting, quarterly reporting over a two-year time period, and seasonal 
variation.  Since Texas public universities are funded by the Legislature on a two year 
budget cycle and this generally results in increased appropriation amounts in biennial 
fiscal years I chose a lag period of 4 for the Newey West estimator.  I use PROC 
MODEL to solve for both the HC and HAC adjustments to standard errors and specify 
the Generalized Method of Moments method of estimation and the Bartlett kernel. 
Identification of influential outliers can be accomplished through a variety of 
measurements of dispersion and leverage.  A naïve appro ch to dealing with outliers is to 
remove them from the dataset—and in cases of measurment error where there is no 
underlying information in the observation this can be the appropriate approach.  When 
outlier observations contain information, however, liminating this information by 
dropping these outliers can seriously skew parameter stimates and standard errors 
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generated using the truncated dataset.  So, how to A) include at least some of the 
information from the observation while B) not allowing the overall model to be impacted 
severely by outliers?  The solution is provided by robust regression.  (As an aside, it 
should also be clear that these solutions do eliminate some information and thus are not 
BLUE in conditions of perfect homoscedasticity and without influential outliers.) 
Robust regression techniques vary from OLS and OLS-derived approaches such 
as HC and HAC because they change the transformation of the residuals used to generate 
the regression equation from a sum of squared values to a different function that modifies 
the weights given to residuals prior to the solution of the regression equation.  This 
results not only in different standard errors (as HC/ AC) but also in different parameter 
estimates.  The class of robust regressions designed to address heteroscedasticity are 
called “M-estimators.”  In this study I use the M-estimation technique described by 
Huber (1964) and implemented in SAS in PROC ROBUSTREG.  Huber’s approach 
divides residuals into two categories—those whose di persion is above and below some 
threshold d (in this study I use the SAS default value of d=2.5).  For residuals with 
absolute values under this threshold, the squared value of the residual used to solve the 
regression equation in OLS is divided in half.  Residuals above this threshold, on the 
other hand, have their values truncated to the threshold value of d divided by 2.  The 
practical effect of this transformation is that the influence of residuals with higher 
dispersion is limited at the cost of removing some of the information from residuals with 
lower dispersion. 
While M-estimators do an excellent job at controlling for heteroscedasticity, they 
are ineffective in controlling for data structures contaminated by influential outliers 
because they cannot distinguish between “good” leverage points with information from 
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“bad” leverage points that represent contaminated data (Chen, 2002).6  A separate 
category of residual transformations attempts to distinguish these two cases—these are 
known as “MM-estimators.”  These transformations replace the linear weights used by 
M-estimators with weights defined by a curve of Gaussian form. 
SAS provides two options for MM-estimators within the PROC ROBUSTREG 
command (TUKEY and YOHAI) that differ in the level of asymptotic efficiency of the 
Gaussian curve use for adjustment (and as a result the amount of information they 
attempt to conserve).  These estimators also assess “breakdown value,” the smallest 
fraction of contaminated observations that will cause the estimator to fail.  In this study I 
use the YOHAI estimator (Yohai, 1987) with SAS defaults (which are set for a 
breakdown value of 0.25 and asymptotic efficiency of 72.7%).  Again, the tradeoff 
inherent in this estimator should make it clear that it is not BLUE in cases of 
homoscedasticity.  I report five regression results: OLS, White (HC), Newey West 
(HAC), Huber (M), and Yohai (MM).   
Control Instruments. 
Martin and Hill group the independent variables of their model into seven 
instruments (p. 20-21).  Two of these instruments function as controls.  The “Scale 
Changes” instrument includes three of the four enrollment variables listed above (ftestu, 
ftgrad, and ptstu) as well as teaching assistants (ta) to track graduate study intensity. 
Their second control instrument is “Cost Savings” and is measured by changes in 
the ratios of contract faculty (cf), part-time faculty (ptf), non-professional employees 
(ftenpro), and part-time non-professional employees (ptnpro) per FTE student.  The first 
two variables measure cost savings generated from shifting to non-full-time faculty.  The 
                                                
6 As implemented in PROC ROBUSTREG the M-estimator pr cedure does alert the researcher to their 
presence and will recommend the use of an MM-estimator. 
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second two variables in this instrument similarly measure the savings from moving to 
part-time, non-professional staff. 
Taken together, these two instruments tell an important part of the story about 
expenditures at universities.  The Scale Change instrument estimates financial costs (or 
savings) from enrollment changes.  The Cost Savings strument estimates what is 
essentially a form of revenue—funds that may be realloc ted to preferred spending within 
the institution.  Finding significant reallocation of funds would provide support for 
Bowen’s hypothesis (since these savings could have been passed to students or returned 
to the state rather than distributed within the firm) and demonstrates the existence of 
winners and losers in a budget struggle at the level of the firm. 
Instruments in the Baumol Decomposition. 
Martin and Hill measure expenditures allocated to the Baumol hypothesis using 
two instruments—“Baumol Benefits” and “Baumol Salaries.”  These are simply the 
variables of staff benefits (benstaff) and staff salaries (staffsal) proportionally allocated to 
the Baumol explanation as described earlier. 
Instruments in the Bowen Decomposition. 
The first instrument in the decomposed Bowen cost estimate is the remainder of 
Baumol Benefits and Baumol Salary instruments—“Bowen Benefits” and “Bowen 
Salaries.”  (Note that, since the parameter estimates for benefits and salaries do not vary 
for Bowen and Baumol estimates, this instrument is reported as “Compensation” in 
Chapter 5.) 
The Bowen hypothesis also includes three other potential explanations for 
changes in expenditures, measured using three different instruments.  One of the key 
arguments of the Bowen hypothesis is that the agency problem in non-profit firms leads 
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to decreasing productivity over time.  Accordingly, Martin and Hill have an instrument to 
measure expenditure changes due to declines in productivity: “Bowen Productivity.”  
This instrument includes the variables measuring FTE faculty (ftef), FTE executive and 
professional employees (fteadmin), and part-time administrators (ptadmin) per 100 FTE 
students as well as the average number of employees per executive (staffsize). 
The second instrument Martin and Hill describe measures the two significant 
potential sources of agency power in a higher education institution—the faculty and the 
professional administration (non-professional staff having little control over spending 
allocations).  Martin and Hill call this the Governance instrument and describe three 
potential types of power structure as the “tenured faculty” explanation (where faculty 
members prevent cost-conscious administrators from making cuts), the “spendthrift 
administrator” explanation (where funds are spent on n n-academic enterprises), and the 
“shared governance” explanation (where there is a power balance between faculty and 
administration that keeps agency problems in check).  It is in this last category that 
Martin and Hill assert institutional cost containment can be found. 
To measure the Governance effect, Martin and Hill use the ratio of tenure/tenure-
track faculty to full-time administrators (ttad) as a measure of the balancing strength 
between the two groups.  Martin and Hill include a squared term for this ratio and argue 
that a convex curve with a global minimum implies an optimal ration of faculty to 
administrators in shared governance, when the power of each balances the agency 
problems of both. 
The final instrument Martin and Hill (2012) use is a measurement of costs related 
to revenues that addresses the Bowen observation about institutions “raising all they can 
and spending all they raise.”  This instrument is constructed using total operating 
revenues less investment income (r v) as well as potential sources of revenue substitution 
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from external donors and unspecified additional sources of revenue (other).  The 
derivation of the donor variable is unclear from their monograph.  In addition, because of 
the unique Texas funding structure of the Permanent University Fund (and to a lesser 
extent the Higher Education Assistance Fund), investm nt income could play a 
significant role in explaining public higher education expenditures in the state.  For this 
reason I use the interest variable in lieu of donor income. 
FUNCTIONAL FORM OF REGRESSION EQUATION  
This study uses a regression equation with a dependent variable of total costs per 
FTE student.  Independent variables for the model include the four instruments described 
above as well as fixed effects for data year (Ti) and institution type (Ii).  Martin and Hill 
suggest a log transformation of the dependent variable (p. 14) to incorporate non-linear 
effects. Since total expenditures per student varied substantially less in the case of Texas 
institutions than in the longer period and national s mple Martin and Hill used I 
investigated whether a linear version of their regression equation would yield acceptable 
results. Applying a log transformation did not improve the adjusted R2 or F-value of the 
model so I did not transform the dependent variable.  This choice also results in a more 
comprehensible functional form and parameter estimates that are easily interpretable. 
The functional form of this model used in this research is as follows: 
 
tc =	β + β…β +	I +	T +	  
(2) 
Where: 
tc = Total cost per FTE student; 
i = Institution type from 1 to i; 
t = Time periods from 1 to t; 
n = Model independent variables from 1 to n; 
I i = Fixed effect for each institution type i; 
Tt = Fixed effect for each time period t; 
βn = Parameter estimate for variable n; and 
µ = Estimate of error term. 
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As described earlier, PROC GLMSELECT, PROC MODEL, and PROC 
ROBUSTREG are used in this study to calculate five solutions to Equation 2.  By 
aggregating the total measured value for each university in a given THECB institution 
type in each year, I calculated a weighted average of ach variable for each year.  For 
example, summing up all teaching assistants and all FTE students in Emerging Research 
institutions and then dividing the first by the second will provide a properly weighted 
value for the variable ta at this institution type.  These weighted variables are then 
applied to the regression model to create estimates of explained expenditures.  
Decomposition of the general equation into two partial differential equations representing 
the Baumol and Bowen hypotheses is used to generate the overall estimate of Bowen and 
Baumol expenditures and for estimates of each of the instruments. 
The partial differential equation for Baumol Costs as defined by Martin and Hill 
is: 
tc
 !" = 	tc#$%
 !" + 	&' (()*
 !"  
(3) 
Similarly, Bowen costs are defined as: 
 
tc
 +( = 
	tc#$%
 +( + 	&' (()*
 +( + &',$-!./%
 +( + 	&'0(/(!(
 +( + 	&'1/($.(
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(4) 
The approach used in this study varies somewhat from the Martin and Hill 
methodology.  They calculate a weighting factor for each institution based on ftestu in the 
first year of their data.  This weighting term is then used to distribute the output of the 
model for each institution and addresses problems caused in their study by lack of a 
balanced panel dataset.  In this study, in contrast, I am able to use calculated partial 
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differential values to create a balanced time serie estimated dataset for all fiscal years in 
the study resulting in a richer potential for descriptive statistics generated by the model. 
Martin and Hill distribute the error term from their model through this same 
weighting approach as an in-sample forecast (p. 18).  Because the THECB institution 
type predictions in this research are directly measured from aggregated sums of the 
independent variables, no weighting factor exists to distribute these error terms and they 
are not assigned to either of the hypothesis or the control variables or instruments. 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL  
I completed all required IRB training and I completed all required IRB forms in 
the web application hosted by the Office of Research Support.  This research proposal 
was classified as “exempt” from IRB review as it uses institutional level aggregated data 
that may not be decomposed to the individual student level.  
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Chapter 4: Analysis of Changes in Model Variables over Time 
Chapter 4 describes how the statewide average value for ach of the variables 
used in the econometric model in this study changed over time and presents variations 
among the five THECB institution types of public universities.  Following this variable-
by-variable review, it synthesizes these descriptions into both an overall statewide picture 
of change and variations from this statewide picture by THECB institution type. 
MEASUREMENT OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
As described in Chapter 3, the dependent variable I use in this study is total cost 
(tc), measured on a per FTE student basis (ftestu).  Between 2003 and 2011, total 
expenditures per FTE student grew from $20,168 to $21,960 in inflation-adjusted 2011 
dollars—an increase of 9%.7  This is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Average real total cost (c) at Texas public universities. 
                                                
7 This chapter presents 2011 dollar values adjusted for inflation using the CPI index.  The econometric 
model uses nominal dollars for each year and converts predicted dollar amounts into 2011 real dollars. 
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Increases in total cost vary by THECB institutional type.  Figure 2 demonstrates 
these differences.  The large difference in expenditures per student at Research 
institutions is particularly notable and supports the importance of a broad examination of 
all types of public universities.  Institutions also display different patterns of change in 
per student expenditures.  Research universities increased expenditures dramatically in 
real terms in the four years immediately following tuition deregulation, from $39,627 to 
$46,012 (14%), suggesting that the policy change led to a one-time adjustment upwards 
in expenditures.  The other four THECB institution types displayed smaller increases in 
real expenditures, ranging from 5% at Emerging Research Universities to 12% at 
Master’s universities.  Tuition deregulation was thus associated with larger increases in 
expenditures at the university type with the highest l vel of research expenditures. 
 
 
Figure 2. Average real total cost (c) at Texas public universities by THECB institution 
type. 
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MEASUREMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
This chapter now turns to describing the independent variables included in the 
econometric model.  I group these variables into four categories: enrollments, salaries and 
benefits, faculty measurements, and revenues. 
Measurement of the Independent Variables—Enrollments. 
The first set of independent variables Martin and Hill define in their econometric 
model measure the number and type of students at aninstitution: FTE students (ftestu), 
full-time graduate students (ftgrad), and part-time students (ptstu).  This section describes 
the statewide average and average by THECB institution type for each in turn. 
The first of these variables is FTE students (ftestu).  Figure 3 presents the 
statewide institutional average for this variable, which increases from 11,810 to 14,154 
FTE students (20%). 
 
 
Figure 3. Average FTE student enrollment (ftestu) at Texas public universities. 
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Figure 4 demonstrates the difference in scale between THECB university types.  
The two Research universities (UT Austin and Texas A&M) are much larger than the rest 
of the sector.  Of note is the increase in enrollment that occurred at all university 
categories but Research universities.  Emerging Research institutions increased 
substantially both in raw numbers and in percentage erms, from an average of 20,714 
FTE students in fiscal year 2003 to 25,821 FTE students in fiscal year 2011 (25%).  
Comprehensive universities increased 22%, Doctoral universities increased 28%, and 
Master’s universities increased 19%. In contrast, to these large rates of enrollment 
growth, Research universities increased only 6%. 
 
 
Figure 4. Average FTE student enrollment (ftestu) at Texas public universities by 
THECB institution type. 
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Figure 5 demonstrates that the average number of full-time graduate students 
(ftgrad) in Texas remained relatively constant from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 
2008, increasing from 1,481 to 1,550 (5%).  Beginning n fiscal year 2009, however, 
average graduate enrollment began to increase markedly, growing to 1,852 in fiscal year 
2011 (a 20% increase in only three years). 
 
 




Figure 6 establishes that the increase in average full-time graduate school 
enrollment was concentrated at Emerging Research universities, where average 
enrollment grew from 2,588 to 3,285 (27%).  Doctoral universities also displayed a sharp 
increase in the final year of the study period, from 923 to 1,079 (17%).  In contrast, 
average full-time graduate student enrollment at Research universities only increased 
from 9,250 to 9,581 during the study period (4%). 
 
 
Figure 6. Average full-time graduate student enrollment (ftgrad) at Texas public 
universities by THECB institution type. 
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The next enrollment variable included by Martin and Hill is part-time student 
enrollment (ptstu), presented in Figure 7.  As with full-time graduate student enrollment, 
part-time student enrollment was relatively flat through 2007 (4%).  From 2007 through 
2011, on the other hand, part-time student enrollment increased 16%.  For the entire 
study period, average part-time enrollment increased 20%. 
 
 
Figure 7. Average part-time student enrollment (p stu) at Texas public universities.  
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Figure 8 demonstrates that growth in part-time student enrollment was largest at 
Doctoral and Comprehensive universities, which displayed increases of 35% and 30% 
respectively.  Part-time enrollment increased at Emerging Research institutions by 17% 
and at Master’s institutions by 15% while Research universities declined by -3%. 
 
 
Figure 8. Average part-time student enrollment (p stu) at Texas public universities by 
THECB institution type.  
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Along with an expansion of graduate enrollment in absolute terms, the ratio of 
teaching assistants per FTE student (ta) also increased during the study period, as detailed 
in Figure 9.  From 2003 through 2011, this ratio increased 35%.  This represents a 
substantial increase in support for graduate education s atewide. 
 
 
Figure 9. Ratio of graduate assistants to FTE students (ta) at Texas public universities.  
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Figure 10 demonstrates that the overall ratio of teaching assistants to FTE 
students is highest at Research institutions and lowest at Master’s universities.  All 
THECB types displayed significant increases in thisratio varying from a 13% increase at 
Research universities to a 46% increase at Doctoral universities. 
 
 
Figure 10. Ratio of graduate assistants to FTE students (ta) at Texas public universities 
by THECB institution type.  
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Independent Variables—Salaries and Benefits. 
The second set of independent variables in the Martin and Hill model are 
measures of average staff salaries and benefits.  Fgure 11 presents the statewide average 
of the first of these, staff salaries (staffsal).  Average salaries climbed moderately in real 
terms from 2003 to 2006 (3%) before declining back to 2003 levels by 2011.  Overall, 
staff salaries almost exactly matched changes in the CPI from 2003 to 2011. 
 
 
Figure 11. Average real staff salaries (taffsal) at Texas public universities.  
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Figure 12 demonstrates how staff salaries changed by THECB category.  Staff 
salaries at Emerging Research institutions substantially lagged the rest of the sector for 
the entire period.  Average staff salaries were highest at Master’s level institutions.  
Average staff salaries increased substantially at Research universities—from $78,725 to 
$82,315 (5%)—and moderately at Master’s universities (2%).  The change in Research 
institution salary expenditures follows their pattern of increases in total expenditures: 
rapid increases in the years immediately following tuition deregulation to a new, higher 
plateau.  In contrast, average staff salaries at the remaining three THECB institution types 




Figure 12. Average real staff salaries (taffsal) at Texas public universities by THECB 
institution type.  
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The second compensation variable Martin and Hill define is average benefits per 
FTE staff member (benstaff).  Figure 13 presents the statewide average of these b nefit 




Figure 13. Average real staff benefits (benstaff) at Texas public universities.  
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Figure 14 demonstrates how staff benefits changed by THECB institution type.  
As with staff salaries, staff benefits at Emerging Research institutions were substantially 
lower than other university types.  Three institution types—Research, Emerging 
Research, and Doctoral—saw small real increases in benefit expenditures, while Master’s 
universities were unchanged and Doctoral universitis saw a substantial drop of -8%.  
The data demonstrate, however, that the real cost of staff benefits was not stable during 




Figure 14. Average real staff benefits (benstaff) at Texas public universities by THECB 
institution type.  
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Independent Variables—Faculty Measurements. 
Martin and Hill use the FTE student measure ftestu described above to construct a 
set of four faculty measurements describing the contract status of academic employees.  
The first of these variables is the ratio of contract faculty per 100 FTE students (cf).  
Figure 15 presents the statewide average of this var able for the study period.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, there were fewer contract faculty per FTE student in 2011 than at the 
beginning of the study period (- 3%) after reaching a peak in 2008. 
 
 
Figure 15. Contract faculty per 100 FTE students (cf) at Texas public universities.  
  
 68 
Figure 16 demonstrates that the usage of contract faculty varied substantially by 
sector.  Contract faculty use at Master’s universitie  jumped in 2004 to over twice the 
level of the lowest usage type (Research) before declining to 1.8 times greater by 2011.  
Doctoral institutions also saw a decline in contract f ulty, from 2.9 per FTE student to 
2.3. Aside from the surge and decline in contract fulty usage at Master’s universities 
and the decline in usage at Doctoral universities, the use of contract faculty during this 
period was relatively stable. 
 
 
Figure 16. Contract faculty per 100 FTE students (cf) at Texas public universities by 
THECB institution type. 
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The next faculty measure Martin and Hill define is the ratio of part-time faculty 
per 100 FTE students (ptf).  Figure 17 presents the statewide average for this variable.  As 
with the contract faculty indicator, use of part-time faculty peaked in 2008 and was lower 
in 2011 than 2003 (-7%). 
 
 
Figure 17. Part-time faculty per 100 FTE students (ptf) at Texas public universities. 
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Figure 18 presents part-time faculty by THECB institution type.  The surge then 
decline of contract faculty at Master’s institutions is repeated here among part-time 
faculty per FTE student.  The overall decline in cotract faculty at Doctoral institutions, 
however, did not occur among the part-time faculty.  In addition, from a low bar, 




Figure 18. Part-time faculty per 100 FTE students (ptf) at Texas public universities by 
THECB institution type. 
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The third faculty variable in the Martin and Hill model is the ratio of FTE faculty 
per 100 FTE students (ftef).  Figure 19 presents the statewide average for this variable.  
After six years where this ratio was largely unchanged, it declined from 3.2 in 2008 to 2.8 
in 2011 (-13%). 
 
 
Figure 19. FTE faculty per 100 FTE students (ftef) at Texas public universities. 
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Figure 20 demonstrates how the ft f ratio varied by THECB institution type.  The 
two THECB institution types with the lowest FTE faculty per student ratios in 2003 
(Research and Emerging Research) both experienced modest increases from 2003 to 
2011 (1% and 5% respectively).  In contrast, the higher faculty to student ratios at the 
other three institution types declined (-22% at Doctoral universities, -8% at 
Comprehensive universities, and -10% at Master’s universities). 
 
 
Figure 20. FTE faculty per 100 FTE students (ftef) at Texas public universities by 
THECB institution type. 
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The final faculty variable used by by Martin and Hill is the ratio of tenure-track 
faculty to non-academic professional employees (ttad), essentially a ratio of the 
relationship between the academic and non-academic activities of the institution.  Figure 
21 presents the statewide average of this measure, which declined rapidly during the 
study period (-23%). 
 
 




Figure 22 demonstrates that the reduction in the ratio of tenured faculty to non-
academic professional staff was concentrated at the Emerging Research, Doctoral, 
Comprehensive, and Master’s institutions—declines of -14%, -16%, -24%, and -33% 
respectively.  In contrast, Research institutions icreased their ratio of tenure-track 
faculty to administrators over the time period by 6%. 
 
Figure 22. Tenure-track faculty per professional non-academic staff (ttad) at Texas 
public universities by THECB institution type. 
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Independent Variables—Staff Measurements. 
The next set of variables defined by Martin and Hill categorize non-instructional 
staff at the institution.  A total of five staffing variables are used in their model.  The first 
of these variables is FTE non-professional employees per 100 FTE students (ftenpro).  
Figure 23 presents the statewide average of this measur .  After a slow period of modest 
decline from 2003 to 2008 this staffing level dropped -17% from 2008 through 2011. 
 
 
Figure 23. Non-professional FTE staff per 100 FTE students (ftenpro) at Texas public 
universities.   
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Figure 24 demonstrates how non-professional staffing ratios varied by THECB 
institution type.  Four of the five THECB institution types exhibited a pattern consistent 
with the state average—slow decline from 2003 through 2008, with significant reductions 
after that fiscal year.  Research institutions, on the other hand, exhibited a different 
pattern.  Not only did they display overall staffing ratios of non-professional staff almost 
twice as high as the rest of the sector but these ratios were largely maintained through the 
study period (dropping only -5% from 2003 through 2011). 
 
 
Figure 24. Non-professional FTE staff per 100 FTE students (ftenpro) at Texas public 
universities by THECB institution type.   
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The next variable in the Martin and Hill methodology is FTE executive and 
professional employees per 100 FTE students (fteadmin).  Figure 25 presents the 
statewide average for this variable.  From 2003 to a peak in 2009 the ratio of these 
employees to FTE students increased 17% before declining to an overall increase of 10% 
for the entire study period. 
 
 
Figure 25. Executive and professional FTE staff per 100 FTE students (fteadmin) at 
Texas public universities.   
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Figure 26 demonstrates how the ft admin variable changed by THECB institution 
type.  As with the non-professional staffing ratio, Research universities had a 
substantially higher number of executive and professional employees per FTE student, 
close to twice the ratio of the rest of the sector.  All THECB institution types displayed 
growth in the proportion of these administrators to s udents—an increase of 2% for 
Research, 15% for Emerging Research, 8% for Doctoral, 1% for Comprehensive, and 
13% for Master’s. 
 
 
Figure 26. Executive and professional FTE staff per 100 FTE students (fteadmin) at 
Texas public universities. 
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The next variable in the Martin and Hill model is the average number of reporting 
employees per executive (staffsize).  Figure 27 presents the statewide average for this 
measure.  For the study period the average staff size for executives declined -17%. 
 
 
Figure 27. FTE staff per FTE executives (taffsize) at Texas public universities.   
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Figure 28 presents the staffsize variable by THECB institution type.  Four of the 
five THECB institution types displayed declines in the average number of employees per 
manager during the study period, with Emerging Research universities demonstrating a 
particularly profound reduction from a peak value in fiscal year 2005 to 2011 of -43%.  
Research universities staff size dropped -20%, Doctoral universities -10%, and 
Comprehensive universities -32%.  In contrast to these large reductions, Master’s 
universities staff size increased 26% and rose from the second lowest level of staffing 
ratio to the highest in the sector. 
 
 
Figure 28. FTE staff per FTE executives (taffsize) at Texas public universities by 
THECB institution type.   
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The final two staffing variables show changes in part-time staffing levels.  The 
first of these variables is the ratio of part-time administrators per 100 FTE students 
(ptadmin).  Figure 29 presents the statewide average for this variable, which dropped a 
total of -37% during this period. 
 
 
Figure 29. Part-time executive and professional staff per 100 FTE students (ptadmin) at 
Texas public universities.   
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Figure 30 shows changes in the part-time administrator ratio by THECB 
institution type.  As with the other staffing variables, the ratio of part-time administrators 
per FTE student was substantially higher at Research institutions and increased 26% from 
2003 through 2009.  In contrast, part-time administrative staff per FTE student decreased 
at the other four THECB university types. 
 
 
Figure 30. Part-time executive and professional staff per 100 FTE students (ptadmin) at 
Texas public universities by THECB institution type.   
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The final staffing variable in the Martin and Hill model is the ratio of part-time 
non-professional staff per 100 FTE students (ptnpro).  Figure 31 presents the statewide 
average for this variable, which declined by -47% during the study period. 
 
 




Figure 32 presents the change in part-time non-professional staff by THECB 
institution type.  Research class universities are again different than the other THECB 
institution types in their large number of part-time non-professional staff per FTE student 
as well as their 12% increase in this ratio from 2003 to 2011.  In contrast, the ratio of 
part-time non-professional staff declined at the other four THECB institution types. 
 
 
Figure 32. Part-time non-professional staff per 100 FTE students (ptnpro) at Texas public 




The final set of variables used by Martin and Hill measure three sources of 
university revenue per FTE student.  Figure 33 presents the statewide average for total 
revenues per student less investment income (rev).  From fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 
2011 rev expanded 9% in real dollars (but declined since 2009). 
 




Figure 34 presents total revenue per student by THECB institution type.  While 
this amount increased for all university classes, the already overwhelming lead in real 
per-FTE student revenue at Research institutions widened dramatically in both 
percentage and absolute terms from 2003 through 2011, from $42,202 to $50,123 (an 
increase of 19%).  This expansion occurred in the years immediately following tuition 
deregulation.  Doctoral universities also experienced a major percentage increase in real 
revenue from $19,956 to $20,938 (19%).  In contrast, Emerging Research universities 
raised average revenue per student from $22,587 to $23,230 (3%), Comprehensive 




Figure 34. Total real revenue per FTE student, less investment income (rev) at Texas 
public universities by THECB institution type.   
  
 87 
The second revenue variable used by Martin and Hill is “other” operating revenue 
(other), a subset of total revenue.  Figure 35 shows the s atewide average for real other 
revenue during the study period.  Overall, other income increased 15% during the study 
period.  While source of revenue is not available in IPEDS, the spike of other income in 
fiscal year 2009 correlates with the wide distribution of addition Federal funds from the 
economic stimulus provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. 
 
 




Figure 36 shows how other income changed during the s udy period by THECB 
institution type.  The massive revenue advantage for Research universities in total 
revenue is also reflected in other revenue.  From 2005 until 2011, other revenue at 
Research institutions increased from $22,163 to $28,761 (30%), faster than their rate of 
total revenue growth.  To put that into perspective, R search universities on average 
generated more revenue from other sources than other institutions generated from all 
sources. 
Doctoral universities experienced a dramatic percentage increase in real other 
income, from $5,763 to $9,550 (66%).  Comprehensive and Master’s universities 
displayed smaller gains from $7,348 to $8,134 (11%) and $6,617 and $6,974 (5%) 
respectively.  Other income at Emerging Research universities actually declined from 
$9,258 to $8,525 (-8%). 
 
 
Figure 36. Real other revenue per FTE student, less interest (other) at Texas public 
universities by THECB institution type.   
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The final revenue variable used by Martin and Hill is investment income per FTE 
student (invest).  Figure 37 presents statewide average investment income per student.  
(The large negative amount in fiscal year 2009 was due to the recession that began at the 
beginning of that fiscal year.)  Overall investment income per FTE student decreased in 
real terms from $653 to $495 (-24%), however this masks wide fluctuations in yearly 
investment income (and demonstrates why removing these funds are important for 
understanding strategic behavior on the part of institutions). 
 
 
Figure 37. Real investment revenue per FTE student (invest) at Texas public universities.   
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Figure 38 presents the variation in investment income by THECB institution type.  
The difference between Research universities and the rest of the sector is stunning; for 
example, in 2011 Research universities generated $1,753 in investment income compared 
to the next highest institution type (Emerging Research) at $446.  Research institution 
investment income also displays a dramatic amount of variation, from a high of $7,604 
per FTE student to a low of -$6,499 during the 2008 economic crisis. 
 
 
Figure 38. Real investment revenue per FTE student (invest) at Texas public universities 
by THECB institution type. 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN THE STATEWIDE VARIABLES . 
There are five major findings at the statewide level for Texas public universities 
following tuition deregulation.  First, real expenditures per FTE student increased 
substantially, by 9% from 2003 through 2011.  Second, this increase in expenditures 
occurred simultaneously with an increase in the number of FTE students (20%) and part-
time students (20%) and that increase in FTE students was largely in the undergraduate 
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category (since graduate students only increased 5%). Third, increases in enrollment and 
spending occurred while salaries and benefits were largely flat (0% and 2% respectively).  
Fourth, all of these increases were associated with increasing revenue on an FTE student 
basis both broadly (9%) and in other revenue (15%).  In short, the scope of the public 
higher education sector increased dramatically both in real expenditures and enrollment 
between fiscal years 2003 and 2011 as tuition deregulation was implemented. 
As the scope of the sector increased, substantial ch nges in staffing patterns 
occurred.  On the academic side of the university, FTE faculty per FTE students dropped 
by -13% while contract faculty and part-time faculty dropped at a smaller rate (-3% and -
7% respectively).  On the non-academic side, non-prfessional positions, both full-time 
and part-time, dropped -21% and -47% respectively.  In contrast to non-professional 
administration and faculty, executive and professional administrators per FTE student 
increased by 10%.  The drop in non-professional staff and increase in professional staff 
led to a -17% decline in average staff size.  Finally, the growth in professional 
administrators combined with the general decline in faculty per FTE student led to a 
decline of -23% in the ratio of tenure-track faculty to non-academic professional staff. 
Variations at Research Institutions. 
Research institutions displayed substantially lower levels of enrollment growth 
than the rest of the sector from 2003 through 2011 (6%).  Enrollment growth in graduate 
students was similar to the rest of the sector at 4%, so the difference compared to other 
THECB institution types occurred due to slow growth in undergraduate enrollment.  In 
contrast to basically flat enrollment, expenditures p r student at these institutions surged.  
Already over two times the amount the next highest THECB institution type, 
expenditures at Research universities grew faster than any other sector during the study 
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period.  These expenditure increases were accompanied by massive revenue growth per 
student—19% in total revenues and 30% in other revenues.  Consequently, the total 
revenue gap between Research universities and the next highest institution type increased 
from $19,331 to $26,105 following tuition deregulation. 
Staffing pattern changes at Research institutions varied substantially from the rest 
of the sector.  Full-time faculty per FTE student rose 1% instead of declining.  This 
institution type displayed the lowest usage of contract faculty and part-time faculty while 
its substantially higher proportion of administrators per FTE student at Research 
institutions was maintained.  Professional and executive staff, two times higher than the 
rest of the sector in 2003, increased at a lower rate of 2% through 2011.  Non-
professional staff, which dropped precipitously elsewhere, only declined -5% at Research 
universities.  Part-time non-academic staff, professional and non-professional, both 
increased (26% and 12% respectively).  Finally, the ratio of tenure-track faculty to 
administrators grew 6% (but remained substantially lower than the rest of the sector). 
Variations at Emerging Research Institutions. 
Enrollment at Emerging Research institutions increased at a greater percentage 
than the statewide average (25%) and graduate student enrollment increased substantially 
more than the statewide average (27%).  The increase in student enrollments was 
accompanied by a modest increase in the FTE student/facul y ratio of 5% while the 
tenure-track to professional staff ratio declined at a lower rate than the statewide average 
(-14%).  The only variation in non-academic staffing that deviated from the statewide 
average was an extraordinarily sharp decline in the average staff size variable, dropping  
-41% during the study period.  Another major variation in this sector was a substantially 
lower level of average staff salaries and benefits than the other four THECB institution 
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types.  Finally, Emerging Research institutions experienced by far the lowest average 
increase in total revenue per FTE student of any THECB institution type, only increasing 
3% from 2003 through 2011. 
Variations at Doctoral Institutions. 
Doctoral institutions exhibited the highest average rat  of FTE student enrollment 
increase in the sector (28%) in addition to a large percentage increase in graduate 
enrollment (61%), particularly from 2009 to 2011.  While student enrollments increased 
across the board, academic staffing levels did not keep pace as the overall FTE student to 
faculty ratio declined -22% (the greatest of any THECB institution type).  Doctoral 
institutions displayed a large decline in contract f culty of -27% and a reduction of the 
ratio of tenure-track faculty to administrators of -16%.  Their large growth in student 
enrollments was accompanied by the second highest rate of total revenue growth of any 
THECB institution type (19%). 
Variations at Comprehensive Institutions. 
FTE student enrollment at Comprehensive institutions grew faster than the 
statewide average at 22%.  This enrollment increase was accompanied by the second 
largest decline in the ratio of tenure track faculty to administration (-24%) and the second 
largest reduction in staff size (-32%).  Comprehensive institutions experienced the third 
highest growth in total revenue per FTE student. 
Variations at Master’s Institutions. 
Overall student enrollment increases at Master’s institutions followed the state 
average, with the exception of a lower than average decline in part-time FTE enrollment 
of -11%.  These institutions began the study period with contract faculty and part-time 
faculty per FTE student ratios over twice the level of the next highest institution type.  
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While this staffing pattern declined during the study period, these ratios remained higher 
than other institutional types through 2011.  These institutions experienced the highest 
reduction in the ratio of tenure track faculty to administration of any THECB institution 
type (-33%) and were the only type to see an increase in administrative staff size (26%).  
Total revenue increased at a lower rate than the stat average (4%).  One final, and rather 
surprising, difference was that the average salary at these institutions was the highest of 
any THECB institution type across the study period. 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN THE PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION SECTOR FROM 2003 TO 
2011 
Statewide real average expenditures per FTE student increased 9% from fiscal 
year 2003 to fiscal year 2011, with Research institutions growing more rapidly than other 
institution types (14%) and expanding their already substantial expenditure advantage 
compared to other THECB institution types.  Salaries and benefits generally remained at 
a constant real level, with benefits modestly outpacing salaries.  Emerging Research 
institutions displayed substantially lower levels of salary per FTE employee while 
Master’s and Research institutions displayed higher levels. 
As expenditures per FTE student increased, FTE studen  enrollments increased 
with growth concentrated among undergraduates.  Increases in enrollment were focused 
in the Emerging Research, Doctoral, and Comprehensiv  universities while Research and 
Master’s universities grew more slowly.  Graduate student enrollment was flat overall; 
however, it increased at Emerging Research and Doctoral universities.  Statewide part-
time enrollment generally increased, however this growth did not occur at Research 
institutions and was more modest at Master’s institutions. 
Across the sector, the ratio of FTE faculty per FTE student dropped during the 
study period with contract and part-time faculty per FTE student dropping at lower rates 
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and potentially indicating some switching of tenure-track to non-tenure track positions.  
This trend was less pronounced at Emerging Research institutions while the faculty FTE 
student ratio at Research institutions increased moestly 
As faculty employment per FTE student declined across the sector, executive and 
professional administrative staff increased by 10% and non-professional administrative 
staff declined -21%.  Research institutions, on the other hand, displayed a low level of 
growth among FTE faculty and FTE executive and professional staff per FTE student, 
however, these ratios remained far above the rest of the sector.  The ratio of tenure-track 
faculty to FTE administrators declined at all institution types but Research universities 
(which experienced a 6% increase).  
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Chapter 5: Econometric Model Results 
Chapter 5 details the results of the econometric model described in Chapter 3.  It 
begins by interpreting the results of the five regression models deployed in this research.  
This analysis examines both the statistical significance and influence (as measured by the 
parameter estimate) of the independent variables and uses differences between the five 
models to identify sources of heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and influential outliers.  
Following this, the chapter presents figures that show variation from 2003 to 2011 for 
each of the instruments in the model by THECB institution type.  It next displays figures 
demonstrating the total estimated real averages for Baumol and Bowen expenditures by 
fiscal year and the ratio of these expenditures.  The chapter concludes by answering the 
research questions that motivate this research. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This chapter presents the statistical results from an econometric model measuring 
Texas public universities expenditures following tuition deregulation.  Were expenditures 
largely constrained by macroeconomic factors in the general labor market (the Baumol 
hypothesis) or do unresolved agency problems, institutional interests, and other 
microeconomic explanations instead explain expenditures (the Bowen hypothesis)?  This 
study addresses two research questions. 
Question 1: To what degree do the competing Baumol and Bowen hypotheses 
explain expenditure changes at public four-year institutions of higher education? 
Question 2: Do public, four-year institutions of higher education with 
strongly defined research missions exhibit different choices in expending these new 
funds? 
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PRESENTATION OF THE REGRESSION MODELS 
The first section of this chapter presents the general conometric model I 
constructed following the methodology described in Chapter 3.  Table 1 compares the 
standard errors for the intercept and the control variables used in the study.  The 
parameter estimate B may be read as the dollars explained by a one-unit change in the 
parameter (or in the case of categorical control variables by being part of that category).  
The White standard error column (HC) reports adjustments to OLS standard errors to 
correct for heteroscedasticity.  The Newey West column (HAC) reports adjustments to 
correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  The columns for heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation report differences between the OLS standard error and the HC and 
HAC estimators.  Differences from 10% to 24% are classified as “Some,” differences 
from 25% to 49% are classified as “Moderate,” and differences of 50% or greater are 
classified as “High.” 
King and Roberts (2015) argue that applying HC standard error corrections 
should not be considered a model fix.  Instead, differences in standard errors should be 
seen as evidence of model misspecification and that the proper response when confronted 
with differences in standard errors due to heteroscedasticity is to investigate whether 
modifications to the functional form of the regression equation can minimize or eliminate 
the non-constant variance.  Differences in standard errors due to autocorrelation, on the 
other hand, are generally due to the OLS procedure not properly discounting the amount 
of information contained in serially situated observations (Horchle, 2007)—with the 
caveat that autocorrelation due to seasonality can be addressed through changes to the 





Table 1: OLS, White (HC), and Newey West (HAC) Regression Results—Intercept and Control Variables 
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)  White (HC)  Newey West (HAC)      
Parameter B SE B p 
 
SE B p 
 
SE B p 
 OLS to 
HC 
OLS to 
HAC Hetero. Auto. 
Intercept -8,037.32 1,971.15 <.001  2,140.50 <.001  2,804.00 .005  9% 42% No Moderate 
Research 8,930.92 1,723.86 <.001  1,758.50 <.001  2,213.90 <.001  2% 28% No Moderate 
Emerg. Research 1,540.74 731.54 .036  738.90 .038  887.90 .084  1% 21% No Some 
Doctoral 82.45 373.14 .825  388.80 .832  550.20 .881  4% 47% No Moderate 
Comprehensive 965.13 338.19 .005  401.30 .017  559.90 .086  19% 66% Some High 
Year: 2011 998.72 509.95 .051  560.40 .076  553.60 .072  10% 9% Some No 
Year: 2010 1,631.08 508.78 .002  565.20 .004  587.30 .006  11% 15% Some Some 
Year: 2009 557.21 525.83 .290  610.20 .362  660.30 .400  16% 26% Some Some 
Year: 2008 378.89 507.29 .456  615.40 .539  649.90 .560  21% 28% Some Moderate 
Year: 2007 -124.05 489.28 .800  521.70 .812  568.30 .827  7% 16% No Some 
Year: 2006 156.38 433.99 .719  523.90 .766  527.00 .767  21% 21% Some Some 
Year: 2005 -243.24 409.79 .553  417.30 .561  409.70 .553  2% 0% No No 
Year: 2004 -11.72 392.91 .976  438.60 .979  373.20 .975  12% -5% Some No* 
               
Model R2 .95              
Notes: Parameter estimates are nominal values.  Differences in standard errors between OLS and White/Newey West are classified as Some between 
10% and 24%, Moderate between 25% and 50% and High at 50% or above.  Reference values for the fixed effect variables are Master’s universities 
and fiscal year 2003.  * HAC standard error is smaller than OLS. 
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Three of the four institution types exhibit significant difference from the reference 
Master’s institutions in the OLS model: Research ($8,931, p < .001), Emerging Research 
($1,541, p = .036), and Comprehensive ($965, p = .005).  Doctoral institutions display 
little difference from the reference and their parameter has low significance (p = .825). 
The fixed effect variables controlling for institution type exhibit virtually no 
increases in standard errors due to heteroscedasticity when the HC estimator is applied, 
indicating that THECB institution type is an effective control for underlying differences 
in expenditures between the universities.  In contrast, the HAC estimator demonstrates 
that all institution-type variables exhibit increass in standard errors when autocorrelation 
is corrected.  Accordingly, the level of significance reported by OLS for these variables 
should be discounted in favor that reported by the HAC estimator. 
Taking into account the HAC reduced standard errors, Research universities 
continue to display a very high level of statistically significant deviation from Master’s 
universities (p < .001) while the significance of the Emerging Research and 
Comprehensive institution-type fixed effect variables decline to p = .084 and p = .086, 
respectively.  In other words, the HAC estimator suggests that there is only limited 
statistically significant difference between the fixed effect variables for THECB 
institutions other than Research universities. 
The year fixed effect variables generally exhibit some heteroscedasticity with six 
of the eight have a difference in standard errors of 10% or greater.  Fiscal years that 
occurred following tuition deregulation exhibit smaller standard errors when 
autocorrelation is accounted for, while fiscal years following tuition deregulation exhibit 
larger standard errors.  This is evidence of discontinuity created by the policy change.  
Under OLS, only the parameter estimate for fiscal year 2010 displays a high level of 
statistical significance (p = .005); fiscal year 2011 displays some statistical significance 
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(p = .051).  Adjustments made by the HAC estimator to correct for autocorrelation 
degrade these to p = .006 and p = .072, respectively. 
Table 2 compares the parameter estimates from the OLS model with the 
parameter estimates generated by the Huber (M) and Yohai (MM) estimators.  Recall that 
the M-estimator adjusts the solution of the regression equation to account for 
heteroscedasticity while the MM-estimator adjusts for heteroscedasticity and influential 
outliers.8  The parameter estimates from the M-estimator for the THECB institution-type 
control variables are similar to OLS results while th MM-estimator parameter estimates 
are more influential than those from OLS.  This difference suggests that outliers are 
contaminating the OLS regression results for the institution type fixed-effect variables in 
addition to the autocorrelation identified in Table 1.  Because the BLUE quality of OLS 
can be easily violated due to the presence of influe tial outliers, this finding suggests that 
parameter estimates generated by the MM-estimator should be used to generate estimated 
values for Baumol and Bowen expenditures. 
Applying the M-estimator to the yearly fixed effect variables yields both greater 
influence in the parameter estimates and improvements in statistical significance (an 
expected result given the heteroscedasticity identifi d by the HC estimator).  The 
influence of the parameter estimates and their level of statistical significance jumps again 
using the MM-estimator, indicating that outliers alo skew the parameter estimates for 
these variables.  The increase in statistical significance for some of the fiscal year fixed 
effect variables when moving from OLS to the MM-estimator is substantial: 2011 (p = 
.051 to p = .001), 2010 (p = .002 to p < .001), 2009 (p = .290 to p = .002), and 2008 (p = 
.456 to p = .004) and supports using the MM-estimator to generate these values. 
                                                
8 During the generation of these model results, the PROC ROBUSTREG procedure identified a number of 




Table 2: OLS, Huber (M-Estimator), and Yohai (MM-Estimator) Regression Results—Intercept and Control Variables 
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)  Huber (M-estimator)  Yohai (MM-estimator)    
Parameter B SE B p  B SE B p  B SE B p  OLS to M OLS to MM 
Intercept -8,037.32 1,971.15 <.001  -7,241.91 1,528.66 <.001  -6,149.38 1,629.48 <.001  -10% -23% 
Research 8,930.92 1,723.86 <.001  8,976.52 1,336.88 <.001  8,508.82 1,452.46 <.001  1% -5% 
Emerg. Research 1,540.74 731.54 .036  1,470.35 567.33 .010  1,072.30 610.25 .079  -5% -30% 
Doctoral 82.45 373.14 .825  35.60 289.38 .902  -181.39 310.41 .559  -57% * 
Comprehensive 965.13 338.19 .005  897.31 262.27 .001  561.60 287.47 .051  -7% -42% 
Year: 2011 998.72 509.95 .051  1,234.79 395.47 .002  1,418.69 423.15 .001  24% 42% 
Year: 2010 1,631.08 508.78 .002  1,819.25 394.57 <.0001  1,984.65 422.55 <.001  12% 22% 
Year: 2009 557.21 525.83 .290  1,033.07 407.79 .011  1,329.79 435.66 .002  85% 139% 
Year: 2008 378.89 507.29 .456  787.39 393.41 .045  1,193.15 419.08 .004  108% 215% 
Year: 2007 -124.05 489.28 .800  382.92 379.44 .313  613.02 402.46 .128  * * 
Year: 2006 156.38 433.99 .719  220.26 336.56 .513  368.81 358.22 .303  41% 136% 
Year: 2005 -243.24 409.79 .553  -92.49 317.80 .771  11.26 333.88 .973  -62% * 
Year: 2004 -11.72 392.91 .976  51.10 304.71 .867  50.21 327.68 .878  * * 
               
Model R2 .95    .86    .73      
Notes: Parameter estimates for Year variables are nominal values.  Reference values for the fixed effect variables are Master’s universities and fiscal 
year 2003.  * Sign change in parameter estimate. 
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In addition to the formal control variables described above, Martin and Hill’s 
methodology includes two instruments that measure shifting expenditures within 
institutions based on program scale changes (from changes in the distribution of students) 
and institutional cost savings (from changes in the distribution of staff).  Table 3 reports 
the OLS results and the HC/HAC standard errors for these two instruments. 
For the Scale Change instrument, the bulk of the explanatory value in the OLS 
model lies in the ratio of graduate assistants per FTE student (ta).  The HC estimator 
indicates that this variable contains some heteroscdasticity while the HAC estimator 
suggests it also displays high levels of autocorrelation.  Despite these issues, the level of 
significance of the variable remains high in all three models (p < .001 for OLS and p = 
.002 for HAC). 
The number of full-time graduate students (ftgrad) displays a high level of 
statistical significance (p = .029).  While the HC estimator does not change this result, the 
HAC estimator suggests a moderate amount of autocorrelation resulting in a substantial 
drop in statistical significance to p = .110.  The ftestu and ptstu variables display low 
levels of statistical significance in OLS (p = .737 and p = .193) both of which are 
degraded under HAC.  Because the sign for ta is positive while the sign for ftgrad is 
negative, the OLS results for the Scale Change instrument suggest a trade-off between 
expenditures on graduate assistants and revenues from g aduate students.  A negative 
value from this instrument would present evidence that graduate education cross-
subsidizes other functions within universities. 
In the Cost Savings instrument, all four variables are highly significant in OLS.  
Under the HC and HAC estimators, contract faculty (cf) and part-time faculty (ptf) 
exhibit no heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation.  Full-time equivalent non-professional 
employment (ftenpro) displays some heteroscedasticity and moderate autocorrelation.  
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Part-time non-professional administrative employment (ptnpro) displays moderate levels 
of autocorrelation.  As a result, the HAC estimator reduces the statistical significance of 
these two variables from a high level (p = .004 for ftenpro and p = .013 for ptnpro) to a 
moderate level (p = .051 for ftenpro and p = .059 for ptnpro).  This result suggests that 
the contribution of non-professional staffing ratios t  explaining university expenditures 
is less than the base OLS model predicts due to serially correlated variation. 
The overall results of the Cost Savings instrument suggest that, while higher 
ratios of part-time faculty per FTE student do decrease total expenditures as expected, 
contract faculty are more expensive than tenure track faculty on a per FTE student basis.  
This is a surprising and interesting finding; it is possible that the substitution of contract 
faculty for tenure-track faculty results not in short term savings costs but rather in 
avoiding long-term financial constraints (and that universities pay a premium for this 
flexibility). 
Interpretation of the administrative employee parameters is straightforward.  
Expenditures increase due to full-time equivalent non-professional employment per FTE 





Table 3: OLS, White (HC), and Newey West (HAC) Regression Results— Scale Changes and Cost Savings 
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)  White (HC)  Newey West (HAC)      
Instrument 
Parameter B SE B p 
 
SE B p 
 
SE B p 
 OLS to 
HC 
OLS to 
HAC Hetero. Auto. 
Scale Changes               
ftestu -0.015 0.044 .737  0.041 .711  0.049 .757  -9% 9% No No* 
ftgrad -0.59 0.27 .029  0.29 .044  0.37 .110  8% 36% No Moderate 
ptstu -0.090 0.069 .193  0.050 .074  0.074 .223  -27% 7% No* No 
ta 714.23 148.63 <.001  183.20 <.001  232.10 .002  23% 56% Some High 
               
Cost Savings               
cf 950.25 391.36 .016  389.70 .015  385.00 .014  0% -2% No* No 
ptf -1,043.79 290.83 <.001  315.70 .001  304.60 .001  9% 5% No No 
ftenpro 398.10 138.27 .004  152.60 .010  202.60 .051  10% 47% Some Moderate 
ptnpro -208.50 83.31 .013  89.12 .020  110.10 .059  7% 32% No Moderate 
               
Model R2 .95              
Notes: Parameter estimates are nominal values.  Differences in standard errors between OLS and White/Newey West are classified as Some between 
10% and 24%, Moderate between 25% and 50% and High at 50% or above.  * HC/HAC standard error is smaller than OLS. 
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Table 4 compares the parameter estimates for the Scal  Changes and Cost Savings 
instrument for the OLS model and robust regression estimators.  In the Scale Change 
instrument, the graduate assistant variable remains highly statistically significant, 
however using the MM-estimator reduces the influence of its parameter estimate from B 
= 714.23 to B = 465.26.  Application of the MM-estimator also reduces the statistical 
significance and influence of expenditures attributa le to full-time graduate enrollment (p 
= .029 to p = .154 and B = -0.59 to B = -0.32).  In contrast, the MM-estimator improves 
the statistical significance and influence of part-time student enrollment (p = .193 to p = 
.033 and B = -0.090 to B = -0.12).  Both results indicate the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and influential outliers. 
All four variables in the Cost Savings instrument are highly statistically 
significant in the OLS model as in well as in the robust regressions.  The influence of 
full-time equivalent, non-professional staff (tenpro) decreases from B = 398.10 to B = 
258.90 when the MM-estimator is applied.  The substantial increase in influence for 
contract faculty (cf) (B = 950.25 to B = 1,251.15) and for part-time faculty (ptf) (B = -
1,043.79 to B = -1,284.79) suggests that these variables are subject to both 
heteroscedasticity and influential outliers in the OLS model and supports the use of the 




Table 4: OLS, Huber (M-Estimator), and Yohai (MM-Estimator) Regression Results—Scale Changes and Cost Savings 
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)  Huber (M-estimator)  Yohai (MM-estimator)    
Parameter B SE B p  B SE B p  B SE B p  OLS to M OLS to MM 
Scale Changes               
ftestu -0.015 0.045 .737  -0.035 0.035 .386  -0.025 0.037 .490  100% 67% 
ftgrad -0.59 0.27 .029  -0.35 0.21 .097  -0.32 0.22 .154  -41% -46% 
ptstu -0.09 0.069 .193  -0.095 0.054 .077  -0.12 0.055 .033  5% 31% 
ta 714.23 148.63 <.001  539.04 115.26 <.001  465.26 122.92 <.001  -25% -35% 
               
Cost Savings               
cf 950.25 391.36 .016  1,129.62 303.51 <.001  1,251.15 327.56 <.001  19% 32% 
ptf -1,043.79 290.83 <.001  -1,174.00 225.54 <.001  -1,284.79 245.19 <.001  12% 23% 
ftenpro 398.10 138.27 .004  338.35 107.23 .002  258.90 114.93 .024  -15% -35% 
ptnpro -208.50 83.31 .013  -238.20 64.61 <.001  -209.01 68.09 .002  14% 0% 
               
Model R2 .95    .86    .73      
Note: Parameter estimates are nominal values.
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Finally, the Martin and Hill methodology contains four instruments used to 
determine the effect of Baumol and Bowen effects.  Table 5 shows these instruments.  
The Compensation instrument measures the relationship between expenditures and 
salaries and benefits.  In the base OLS model, both of these variables are highly 
significant (p < .001 and p = .001).  The parameter estimates suggest that one d llar of 
salary is equivalent to 2.8 dollars of benefits in explaining expenditures. 
The HC estimator suggests there is some heteroscedasticity in the salary variable 
while the HAC estimator suggests that both variables in the Compensation instrument 
display substantial autocorrelation (not a surprising result given the low level of 
employee attrition at universities and the relationship previous year salary has on the 
following year).  This autocorrelation degrades the statistical significance of the variables 
using the HAC estimator.  The staffsal variable remains highly significant (p < .001 to p 
= .006) while the significance of the benstaff variable drops from p = .001 to p = .062. 
Two of the four variables in the Productivity instrument are highly significant in 
the OLS model: full-time administrators per FTE student (fteadmin) (p < .001) and part-
time administrators per FTE student (p admin) (p = .007).  Both ratios are associated with 
increased expenditures.  Employing the HC estimator results in higher standard errors for 
the full-time administrator variable suggesting some heteroscedasticity exists; however, 
since the statistical significance of fteadmin remains unchanged at p < .001 there does not 
appear to be a need to include a quadratic term for this variable in the functional form of 




Table 5: OLS, White (HC), and Newey West (HAC) Regression Results—Baumol and Bowen Instruments 
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)  White (HC)  Newey West (HAC)      
Instrument 
Parameter B SE B p 
 
SE B p 
 
SE B p 
 OLS to 
HC 
OLS to 
HAC Hetero. Auto. 
Salary and 
Benefits 
              
staffsal 0.069 0.016 <.001  0.018 <.001  0.025 .006  14% 57% Some High 
benstaff 0.16 0.047 .001  0.049 .002  0.062 .012  5% 32% No Moderate 
               
Productivity               
ftef -714.78 409.22 .082  397.40 .073  456.20 .118  -3% 11% No * Some 
fteadmin 1,363.74 205.63 <.001  238.10 <.001  253.00 <.001  16% 23% Some Some 
ptadmin 758.97 277.54 .007  292.40 .010  297.60 .011  5% 7% No No 
staffsize -3.42 14.66 .816  17.92 .849  26.820 .899  22% 83% Some High 
               
Revenue               
rev 0.69 0.057 <.001  0.070 <.001  0.092 <.001  -13% 61% No* High 
other -0.54 0.064 <.001  0.080 <.001  0.097 <.001  -14% 50% No* High 
invest -0.074 0.079 .351  0.089 .406  0.101 .466  -12% 28% No* Moderate 
               
Governance               
ttad 555.44 535.13 .300  623.70 .374  588.00 .346  17% 10% Some Some 
               
Model R2 .95              
Notes: Parameter estimates are nominal values.  Differences in standard errors between OLS and White/Newey West are classified as Some between 
10% and 24%, Moderate between 25% and 50% and High at 50% or above.  * HC standard error is smaller than OLS. 
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The full-time equivalent faculty ratio is on the edg  of statistical significance in 
the OLS model; however, this variable displays some autocorrelation and its statistical 
significance is diminished in the HAC estimator (p = .082 to p = .118).  Finally, the ratio 
of staff size to number of administrators displays very low statistical significance (p = 
.816).  Because it also demonstrates some heteroscedasticity and a high degree of 
autocorrelation (the highest variance in standard er ors in this study) the low level of 
significance for this variable is further degraded in the HAC estimator (p = .899). 
Two variables in the Revenue instrument in the OLS model are highly significant: 
total revenue less investment income (r v) and other income (other) (both p < .001).  
Investment income (invest) displays a low level of statistical significance (p = .351).  As 
in Martin and Hill’s results, rev is associated with increases in expenditure while oth r is 
associated with declines.  In the model, core revenues function as an omitted variable.  
Since the sign of rev is positive, this indicates that an increase in total revenue leads to a 
larger increase in expenditures than the same amount f increase in core revenue.  
Similarly, an increase in the other revenue variable implies that revenue from these 
sources results in lower levels of expenditures than core revenue.  These results could be 
related to the relative long-term stability of different revenue sources. 
None of the three variables in the Revenue instrument display increased standard 
errors due to heteroscedasticity; in fact, all display reduced standard errors in the HC 
estimator.9  All three variables display moderate to high leves of autocorrelation; 
however, this autocorrelation does not degrade the s atistical significance of the total 
revenue or other income variables (both of which remain at p < .001). 
                                                
9 It is possible these variables represent an example of a rare form of heteroscedasticity with non-consta t, 
lower variance in the middle of the distribution. 
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The Governance instrument has one variable—the ratio of tenure-track faculty to 
administrators.  The variable does not display statistical significance in the OLS model 
and this lack of significance is degraded further by heteroscedasticity.  Performing a 
quadratic transformation on this variable (as suggested by Martin and Hill) does not 
result in an increase in statistical significance and its quadratic functional form does not 
display the global minimum of Martin and Hill’s model.  This finding merely indicates 
that an increase in the ratio of tenure track faculty to FTE students increases expenditures 
with some diminishing returns. 
Table 6 presents the robust regression estimators for the instruments measuring 
Baumol and Bowen effects.  The first of these is the Compensation index.  The M-
estimator suggests that some heteroscedasticity exists in the salary variable (confirming 
the analysis of standard errors).  More significantly, the MM-estimator suggests that the 
OLS parameter estimates for this variable are substantially inflated by the presence of 
influential outliers and this reduces the influence of the salary variable (B = 0.07 to B = 
0.051) and the benefits variable (B = 0.16 to B = 0.12).  Since Baumol effects are 
captured only by this instrument, this result suggests that the OLS regression solution 
overestimates Baumol expenditures due to outliers and provides a strong reason to use 




Table 6: OLS, Huber (M-Estimator), and Yohai (MM-Estimator) Regression Results—Baumol and Bowen Instruments 
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)  Huber (M-estimator)  Yohai (MM-estimator)    
Parameter B SE B p  B SE B p  B SE B p  OLS to M OLS to MM 
Salary and Benefits               
staffsal 0.069 0.016 <.001  0.058 0.012 <.001  0.051 0.013 <.001  -16% -25% 
benstaff 0.16 0.047 .001  0.14 0.036 <.001  0.12 0.038 .001  -8% -21% 
               
Productivity               
ftef -714.78 409.22 .082  -885.68 317.36 .005  -1,052.22 337.99 .002  24% 47% 
fteadmin 1,363.74 205.63 <.001  1,479.64 159.47 <.001  1,531.14 178.13 <.001  8% 12% 
ptadmin 758.97 277.54 .007  640.19 215.23 .003  496.68 229.18 .030  -16% -35% 
staffsize -3.42 14.66 .816  -13.73 11.37 .227  -21.65 12.75 .090  301% 532% 
               
Revenue               
rev 0.69 0.057 <.001  0.68 0.044 <.001  0.68 0.050 <.001  -1% -1% 
other -0.54 0.064 <.001  -0.52 0.050 <.001  -0.49 0.055 <.001  -4% -9% 
invest -0.074 0.079 .351  0.0082 0.061 .893  0.082 0.070 .239  * * 
               
Governance               
ttad 555.44 535.13 .300  981.03 415.00 .018  1,261.18 468.71 .007  77% 127% 
               
Model R2 .95    .86    .73      
Notes: Parameter estimates are nominal values.  * Sign change in parameter estimate.
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The robust regression solutions lead to little change i  the parameter estimate and 
statistical significance of full-time administrators per FTE student; the variable remains 
both significant and influential.  In contrast, the robust regression estimators degrade the 
statistical significance and influence of the part-time administrator variable (p = .007 to p 
= .030 and B = 758.97 to B = 498.68) indicating that outliers skew this variable. 
In contrast, application of the M-estimator leads to a dramatic increase in 
statistical significance (from p = .082 to p = .005) for the full-time faculty per FTE 
student variable and this significance is improved further by the MM-estimator (p = 
.002).  This result raises the possibility that the functional form of ftef is misspecified in 
the model.  I examined this possibility with OLS with a quadratic transformation.  The 
resulting functional form is slightly concave upwards but expenditures explained by the 
non-linear form increase at a rate only slightly above linear.  Given this modest change, 
and that implementing the MM-estimator corrects for this non-linear relationship, I opted 
to avoid sacrificing a degree of freedom to include this transformation in the final model. 
An increase in statistical significance and influenc  between the OLS result and 
MM-estimator result of the staffsize variable suggests another potential misspecification 
in the model (p = .816 to p = .090 and B = -3.42 to B = -21.65).  As with the ftef variable, 
I investigated this relationship with a quadratic transformation and it too displayed a 
functional form with slightly concave upwards curve.  In the case of staffsize, however, in 
addition to the slight difference between the linear and non-linear versions of the 
independent variable the overall influence of the variable was small (explaining only $72 
in expenditures per FTE student at the median value for staffsize).  Because the MM-
estimator adjusts this variable well, and because the influence of the variable is so small, 
I opted to preserve a degree of freedom and leave the linear term in the model (although a 
case could be made for dropping it entirely). 
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Application of the robust regression estimators to the variables in the Revenue 
instrument does not change the significance of rev and other variables in the instrument.  
There is some indication of modest skew from influential outliers in the other variable 
that reduce its influence (B = -0.54 to B = -0.49). 
The final instrument in the Martin and Hill framework is Governance, represented 
by the ratio of tenure-track faculty to administrators (ttad).  Martin and Hill find that this 
variable is highly significant in a quadratic transformation, a transformation that results in 
a global minimum they interpret as a “Golden Mean” for faculty to staff ratios.  As with 
the staffsize and ftef variables, the low level of statistical significane (p = .300) in the 
OLS model is improved by the M-estimator (p = .018) and MM-estimator (p = .007) 
indicating either model misspecification or influential outliers.  Accordingly, I also 
examined a quadratic transformation of the tad variable in OLS.  Unlike the ftef and 
staffsize variables, this transformation did not result in a st tistically significant pair of 
variables and, unlike Martin and Hill, the functional form did not display a global 
minimum.  The implication is that the robust regression estimators are performing as they 
are designed to—reducing heteroscedasticity and limiting the impact of influential 
outliers.  A change in functional form to the variable is thus unnecessary. 
ESTIMATION OF INSTRUMENT EFFECTS 
This presentation of the general model establishes t at the data generally display 
fairly low levels of heteroscedasticity and some degre  of autocorrelation (expected in a 
balanced panel dataset).  The results of the MM-estimator, however, establish that the 
data exhibit substantial contamination from outliers that have measurable impacts on the 
standard errors and influence of some of the independent variables in the model.  Most 
critically, the outliers cause the OLS model to overstate the explanatory value of the 
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Compensation instrument and thus the estimate of Baumol expenditures.10  Accordingly, 
this study uses the parameter estimates generated by the MM-estimator to calculate mean 
values of the instruments for the five THECB institution types.  Since the regression 
equations presented above were generated using nominal values, the calculation of yearly 
average values also includes a transformation into 2011 constant dollars using a CPI 
deflator that corresponds with the Texas fiscal year. 
The fixed effect variable controlling for fiscal year presents an opportunity to 
examine the overall trend of expenditures following tuition deregulation.  Figure 39 
shows these values and the difference pre- and post tuition deregulation is dramatic.  
Tuition deregulation appears to have led to an increase in per FTE student expenditures 
on the order of $1,400 at all universities from pre-deregulation expenditure levels 
(averaging $1,512 between fiscal years 2008 but with a spike in 2010). 
  
                                                





Figure 39. Estimated real expenditure change per FTE student by fiscal year, controlling 
for other variables. 
Figure 40 presents the proportion of expenditures explained by the Scale Change 
instrument by THECB institution type.  All estimated values of the instrument are 
negative.  Since the variables with negative parameter stimates were not statistically 
significant in the MM-estimator this result suggests potential multicollinearity between 
the variables in the instrument.  A potential interpr tation of the results from this 
instrument is that graduate students without support cr ss-subsidize other functions of the 
university beyond expenditures required to support teaching and graduate assistants. 
The Scale Change instrument displays substantial variation by research intensity 
across the sector, with Emerging Research and Research universities displaying a large 
amount of potential cross-subsidy from graduate education to elsewhere in the university.  
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Intriguingly, the amount of the subsidy drops rapidly uring the study period at Research 
universities, from -$6,943 to -$4,850 (-30%).  Given that these universities did not see a 
drop in graduate students, this drop must be explained through an expansion in support 
for graduate studies through increasing expenditures on teaching and graduate assistants. 
 
 
Figure 40. Estimated real expenditure changes per FTE Studen due to Scale Changes by 
THECB institution type. 
Figure 41 presents estimated values for the Cost Savings control instrument by 
THECB institution type.  While Martin and Hill report the instrument as measuring a cost 
subsidy, the results from this study suggest that te variables in the instrument are related 
to higher levels of expenditures.  This result occurs because the ratio of contract faculty 
to FTE students is associated with higher expenditures than the ratio of tenure-track 
faculty to FTE students.  A potential explanation for this result is that Texas public 
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universities have been paying a premium for shorter term labor arrangements in lieu of 
long-term tenure commitments on a per FTE faculty basis. 
From 2003 to 2011, universities shifted dollars between faculty types and this led 
to a reduced amount of expenditures the instrument explains (and reflects funds shifted to 
other expenditures elsewhere in the institution).  The expenditure drop was particularly 
pronounced at Research universities ($4,821 to $2,636, -45%) and Doctoral universities 
($5,154 to $2,383, -54%).  Smaller drops occurred at Emerging Research (-25%), 
Comprehensive (-37%), and Master’s universities (-25%).  
 
 
Figure 41. Estimated real expenditure changes per FTE studen due to Cost Savings by 
THECB institution type. 
Compensation accounts for both Baumol and Bowen effects in the Martin and 
Hill model (because data limitations do not allow these measures to be broken down by 
functional administrative area).  Martin and Hill use a statistical correlation between 
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compensation and staffing variables to estimate that 51% of benefit costs and 52% of 
salaries are due to Baumol effects.  Departing from this approach, I created an OLS 
regression model to determine the proportion of salaries and benefits that could be 
explained by staffing patterns.  This model finds a weaker Bowen relationship to benefits 
and salaries than that reported by Martin and Hill: 30% for benefits and 39% for salaries.  
In the Martin and Hill methodology, salaries and benefits not explained by Bowen effects 
are presumed to be due to Baumol effects, so the remainder of the predicted values of 
benstaff and staffsal are distributed to Baumol effects (70% and 61%). 
Figure 42 presents the amount of expenditures explained by the Compensation 
instrument.  There is little variation in overall expenditures by THECB institution type, 
with the exception of a lower proportion of explained expenditures at Emerging Research 
universities.  From 2003 to 2011, all institutions exhibited real drops in expenditures 
explained by the Compensation instrument.  These drops were of similar scale, ranging 
from 13% at Research universities to 19% at Emerging Research universities.  This result 
suggests that Baumol expenditures diminished during the period of this study (although 
there is no clear discontinuity to support a difference before and after tuition 
deregulation).  The results also suggest that there is little differentiation in 





Figure 42. Estimated expenditure changes per FTE student due to Compensation by 
THECB institution type. 
The final three instruments measure various proposed Bowen effects.  Figure 43 
presents the Revenue instrument, the most important of the three.  Unsurprisingly, 
Research universities display much higher absolute estimated levels of expenditures 
explained by total revenue.  During the study period, the proportion of expenditures 
explained by this instrument declined for all institution types, ranging from a drop of -7% 
at Research universities to -14% at Comprehensive universities. This drop reflects the 






Figure 43. Estimated real expenditure changes per FTE studen due to Revenue by 
THECB institution type. 
The large expenditure difference between Research institutions and the rest of the 
sector is also apparent in the proportion of expenditures explained by the Productivity 
instrument, displayed in Figure 44.  There is also an intriguing discontinuity for these 
universities following tuition deregulation, with a sharp decline from $15,848 to $11,107 
(-30%) in expenditures. Over the study period Emerging Research universities declined  
-17%, Doctoral universities declined -6%, and Comprehensive and Master’s universities 
declined -2%.  The decline in dollars explained by this instrument is correlated with 
research intensity as measured by THECB institution type.  The role of full-time 
administrators per FTE student in explaining expenditures declined following tuition 
deregulation, particularly at Research universities.  Thus, the popular view of the role of 
“administrative bloat” in increased expenditures when revenues increase is not apparent 





Figure 44: Estimated real expenditure changes per FTE studen due to Productivity by 
THECB institution type. 
The Governance instrument is presented in Figure 45.  All university types 
displayed reductions in the proportion of expenditures explained by the ratio of tenure-
track faculty to administrators.  At the beginning of the study period there was a wide 
spread of dollars explained by this instrument, in reverse order of research intensity.  All 
university types displayed declines in the dollars explained by this instrument over the 
study period, ranging from -28% at Research universti s to -55% at Master’s universities 
and these declines appear to be leading to convergence across the entire sector.  The 
relatively low level of expenditures explained by this instrument, combined with the lack 
of support for a quadratic function with a global mini um, means this research does not 
support Martin and Hill’s contention that there is a “Golden Mean” balancing the tenure-
track faculty and professional administration and that ameliorates potential agency abuse 





Figure 45: Estimated real expenditure changes per FTE studen due to Governance by 
THECB institution type. 
ESTIMATING TOTAL BAUMOL AND BOWEN EFFECTS 
Figure 46 presents total real estimated Bowen expenditures during the study 
period.  Dollars explained by Bowen expenditures declin d for all university types during 
the study period.  These declines ranged from -14% at Emerging Research universities to 
-18% at Research universities.  Figure 47 presents total estimated Baumol effects for the 
study period.  Baumol expenditures also declined across the sector from -13% at 
Research universities to -19% at Emerging Research universities. 
These drops were balanced by an increase in explained dollars by the fiscal year 
fixed effect term and the reduction in negative explained dollars in the Scale Change 
instrument.  This establishes that, during the period when tuition was deregulated at 
Texas public universites, increases in revenue were used to diminish existing subsidies 
from graduate education to the rest of the instituition rather than increase either Baumol 





Figure 46: Estimated real expenditure changes per FTE studen due to Bowen effects. 
 
 




Figure 48 presents the Bowen/Baumol ratio and demonstrates the substantial 
difference of these expenditures by THECB institution type, a difference that persists 
across the study period.  THECB institution types with a stronger research focus display 
higher levels of Bowen expenditures relative to Baumol expenditures than other THECB 
institution types.  These ratios range from a high of 8.4 at Research universities to a low 
of 3.7 at Master’s universities.  Bowen expenditures lative to Baumol expenditures 
increased at Emerging Research (6%) and Doctoral institutions (4%) and decreased at 
Research (-5%), Master’s, (-3%), and Comprehensive (-1%) institutions.  These results 
suggest that institutions aspiring to greater research intensity devote proportionally more 
resources to Bowen expenditures during periods of increasing expenditures while those 
with fixed missions (either high or low research intensity) see a relative increase in the 
proportion of Baumol expenditures. 
 
 
Figure 48. Bowen-to-Baumol ratio. 
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INVESTIGATING MULTICOLLINEARITY  
Given the functional form of the model—multiple indcators combined into single 
instruments—I wanted to examine the sources of multicollinearity this specification has 
the potential to create.  While multicollinearity does not invalidate a regression model, 
examining its role can aid in its interpretation, particularly values of parameter estimates.  
The analysis of the model presented above suggests two potential sources of 
multicollinearity: the relationship of full-time graduate students to graduate assistants and 
the relationship of contract faculty to part-time faculty. 
My first test procedure was to calculate Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) in the 
model (after removing the nominal control variables from consideration) using the PROC 
REG function in SAS.  Eight variables demonstrated a VIF over 10 (the threshold for 
indicating multicollinearity): cf, ptf, ta, ftestu, ftgrad, fteadmin, rev, and other.  The cf and 
ptf variables are elements of the Cost Savings instrument and the ftestu, ftgrad, and ta 
variables are elements of the Scale Change instrument.  The other three variables with 
potential multicollinearity are parts of the Revenu instrument (rev and other) and the 
Productivity instrument (fteadmin).  The sources of potential multicollinearity identified 
in the presentation of the general model are contained n the first two instruments. 
I next conducted a clustering analysis on the interval-ratio variables in the model 
to investigate any underlying factors that might link these variables using PROC 
VARCLUS.  This analysis indicates the presence of seven underlying factors in the data 
matrix.  Of particular interest is a cluster contaiing ftestu, ta, and ftgrad, a cluster 
containing cf and ptf, and a cluster containing rev and other.  This result indicates that the 
multicollinearity in seven of the eight variables is explained due to interactions between 
with three clusters and that these interactions are contained in single instruments in the 
regression model.  Finally, the eighth variable (ft admin) is in a cluster with ttad (the 
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ratio of faculty to administrators) and represents a third potential source of 
multicollinearity in the regression models, and one that crosses instruments.  Table 7 
shows these cluster groupings. 
Table 7: Cluster Groupings of Interval-Ratio Variables 
Cluster Variables 
Cluster 1 ta, ftestu, ftgrad 
Cluster 2 cf, ptf, ftef 
Cluster 3 staffsal, benstaff 
Cluster 4 ftenpro, ptadmin, ptnpro 
Cluster 5 staffsize 
Cluster 6 rev, other 
Cluster 7 ttad, fteadmin 
Cluster 8 ptstu 
Cluster 9 invest 
Notes: Generated by PROC VARCLUS, Maxeigen = 0.7. 
The final approach I used to investigate multicollinearity in the model was to 
implement a reduced variable version of the model.  While many variable reduction 
techniques (such as stepwise) show significant issues in experimental tests of efficacy, 
using the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) estimation technique 
as implemented in PROC GLMSELECT can sharply reduce this problem (Flom & 
Cassell, 2007).  Table 8 presents this four-variable reduced-form model. 
Table 8: Results for LASSO Regression 
Instrument Parameter Entry Order B F Pr>F 
Intercept   3,804.04   
Control-THECB Type Research 3 4,841.48 534.18 <.001 
Salary and Benefits benstaff 4 0.06 39.92 <.001 
Productivity fteadmin 2 1,041.72 105.46 <.001 
Revenue rev 1 0.46 297.91 <.001 
Note: Model adjusted R2 = .88 (F < .001) 
The results of the LASSO regression support the validity of the general model.  
The three Baumol and Bowen instruments with important predictors (Compensation, 
Productivity, and Revenue) are each measured by a single parameter in the reduced-form 
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model.  The inclusion of only Research as a control for THECB institution type is not a 
surprise given the analysis of the Class parameter estimates earlier.  Neither the controls 
for fiscal years nor the instruments measuring Scale Changes or Cost Savings are 
included.  The Governance instrument is unrepresentd; not an unexpected result given 
the low influence of this instrument and the multicollinearity ttad exhibits with fteadmin. 
To examine the effect of these three identified sources of possible 
multicollinearity I created a cross product terms for the three relationships and 
investigated them using OLS.  The first of these equations uses ttad and fteadmin.  All 
three elements (ttad, fteadmin, and ttad*fteadmin) were statistically significant.  I 
examined the functional form of the cross-product equation generated by the OLS output 
in a range of values between the 25th and 75th percentiles of the variables.  The resulting 
curve displays a slightly concave upwards form and trends upwards but deviation from a 
linear relationship is minimal and there is no global maximum or minimum.  This 
suggests that use of the interaction term is unnecessary.  Given that this multicollinearity 
crosses two instruments, future research should consider dropping one of these variables. 
I next examined the cross product equation for cf, ptf, and cf*ptf.  As with the 
investigation of ttad and fteadmin, all three terms are statistically significant.  The 
function exhibits a slightly concave-upwards form with a downward slope and there is no 
global maximum or minimum.  The curvilinear relationship departs only minimally from 
a linear relationship and changing the functional form of the model for this small 
adjustment is unnecessary. 
The final potential candidate for multicollinearity is the relationship between 
ftgrad, ta, and ftgrad*ta.  As with the relationship between ttad and fteadmin, the 
resulting curve displays a slightly concave upwards form and trends upwards.  Deviation 
from a linear relationship is minimal and there is no global maximum or minimum.  
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Accordingly, changing the functional form of the reg ssion model to address this mild 
multicollinearity is unnecessary. 
ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Question 1: To what degree do the competing Baumol and Bowen hypotheses 
explain expenditure changes at public four-year institutions of higher education? 
The model developed for this research establishes (at least for public universities 
in Texas) that the Bowen hypothesis explains substantially more expenditures at 
universities than the Baumol hypothesis.  The ratio of Bowen to Baumol expenses is 
highest at elite Research universities (as high as 8.4) and it is lowest at the least selective, 
least research intensive Master’s universities (as low as 3.7).  Patterns in expenditure 
changes differ depending on the research intensity of the institution. 
Question 2: Do public, four-year institutions of higher education with 
strongly defined research missions exhibit different choices in expending these new 
funds? 
Additional tuition did not lead to an expansion of Bowen expenditures relative to 
Baumol expenditures at Research institutions; indeed this ratio of Bowen to Baumol 
expenditures drops by -5%.  This ratio also decreases at Comprehensive and Master’s 
universities with low research intensity missions (-1% and -3%).  The THECB institution 
types of Emerging Research and Doctoral institutions, however, display substantial 
increases in Bowen expenditures relative to Baumol expenditures (6% and 4%).  This 
suggests that the lower-level research universities with aspirations to higher research 





The results presented in this chapter demonstrate that the Martin and Hill 
methodology can be used to construct estimates of Baumol and Bowen expenditures for 
the entire range of Texas public universities.  Themodel itself possesses a high level of 
statistical significance as well as substantial explanatory influence.  These results broadly 
confirm Martin and Hill’s initial work that Bowen expenditures are a larger proportion of 
total university expenditures than Baumol expenses.  The findings also confirm my 
intuition that launched this project—that research intensity would lead to differential 
ratios of Baumol and Bowen expenditures.  Unexpectedly, however, it is aspiring 
research universities, not top-tier institutions, that display proportional increases in their 
ratio of Bowen expenditures to Baumol expenditures.  Finally, institutions (particularly 
Research universities) appear to have used additional fu ds from tuition deregulation to 




Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions 
Chapter 6 of this study reiterates the problem statement this research addresses 
and then answers the two research questions it asks.  Following this, it reviews the results 
for each of the instruments in the econometric model to xamine how those results might 
inform existing theory on higher education finance.  It moves to an assessment of the 
significance of the findings from this research, reflections on surprising results and 
potential importance for practice, then addresses th  limitations of the research.  Finally, 
the chapter concludes with three concrete proposals for additional research based on the 
model developed for this study. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT , RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AND METHODS 
This chapter summarizes the conclusions of an econometric model that examines 
Texas public university expenditures following tuition deregulation.  This model 
measures expenditures explained by macroeconomic factors in the general labor market 
(the Baumol hypothesis) and compares them to expenditures explained by unresolved 
agency problems, the pursuit of institutional interests, and other microeconomic factors 
(the Bowen hypothesis).  This model answers two research questions: 
Question 1: To what degree do the competing Baumol and Bowen hypotheses 
explain expenditure changes at public four-year institutions of higher education? 
Question 2: Do public, four-year institutions of higher education with 
strongly defined research missions exhibit different choices in expending these new 
funds? 
To answer these questions, the model links expenditures at higher education 
institutions with instruments that measure the relative effects of the competing Baumol 
and Bowen hypotheses.  Institutional mission can have a profound effect on spending 
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decisions, and as a result the model controls for institutional type (and this control allows 
the model to answer the second of the research questions).  In addition, because the 
analysis uses time series data, the model controls for yearly changes in the policy 
environment. 
Regression equations solved using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) can be shown 
under the Gauss-Markov Theorem to be BLUE—Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (where 
“best” means lowest variance of the estimate).  Unfortunately, the assumptions required 
for OLS estimates to be BLUE are rigorous and under real-world conditions are rarely 
met, particularly for panel data such as that used in this research.  Deviations from the 
Gauss-Markov assumption of constant variance can be partly addressed through changes 
to the residual structure that modify the standard er ors reported by the procedure without 
changing the mean value parameter estimates that OLS provides.  These adjusted 
standard errors are measured using either heteroscedasticity consistent (HC) or 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimators. 
Robust regression techniques vary from OLS and OLS-derived approaches such 
as HC and HAC because they change the transformation used to solve the regression 
equation from a sum of squared values to a different fu ction that modifies the weights 
given to residuals when solving the regression equation.  This change results in different 
standard errors as well as different parameter estimates.  The class of robust regressions 
designed to address heteroscedasticity are called “M-estimators.”  While M-estimators do 
an excellent job at controlling for heteroscedasticity, they are ineffective in controlling 
for data structures contaminated by influential outliers because they cannot distinguish 
between “good” leverage points with information from “bad” leverage points that 
represent contaminated data.  A separate category of residual transformations attempts to 
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distinguish these two cases, known as “MM-estimators.”  In this study, I report five 
regression results: OLS, White (HC), Newey West (HAC), Huber (M), and Yohai (MM).   
The dataset used in this study generally displays fairly low levels of 
heteroscedasticity and some degree of autocorrelation.  The results of the MM-estimator, 
however, show that the data exhibit substantial contamination of influential outliers that 
have measurable impacts on the interpretation and power of the model, most critically in 
overstating the explanatory value of the Compensation instrument and thus the 
importance of Baumol expenditures relative to Bowen expenditures.  As a result, MM-
estimator parameter estimates are used to generate all verage values. 
RESULTS 
Statewide real average expenditures per FTE student at Texas public universities 
increased 9% from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2011.  Expenditure growth at Research 
institutions outpaced other THECB institution types (14%) and expanded their already 
substantial spending advantage.  Fiscal years following tuition deregulation exhibit 
smaller standard errors when autocorrelation is accounted for, while fiscal years 
following tuition deregulation exhibit larger standar  errors; this is evidence of a 
discontinuity created by the policy change.  Analysis of yearly fixed effects before and 
after tuition deregulation suggests that the policy change led to an increase in 
expenditures above pre-deregulation levels on the ord r of $1,400 in 2011 constant 
dollars per FTE student at all universities (Figure 39).  As expenditures per FTE student 
increased, FTE student enrollments also increased (by 20%).  This growth was 
concentrated in the undergraduate population. 
Constant dollar expenditures explained by Bowen expenditures declined for all 
university types during the study period.  These declin s ranged from -14% at Emerging 
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Research universities to -18% at Research universities (Figure 46).  Baumol expenditures 
also declined across the sector, from -13% at Research universities to -19% at Emerging 
Research universities (Figure 47).  These drops in Bowen and Baumol expenditures were 
balanced by the across-the-board increases in explained expenditures from the fiscal year 
fixed effect term.  In addition, institutions (particularly Research universities) appear to 
have used additional funds from tuition deregulation  reduce pre-deregulation subsidies 
from graduate education to the rest of their institutions.  Finding this significant 
reallocation of funds provides support for Bowen’s hypothesis.  These are savings that 
could have been passed to students or returned to the state rather than distributed within 
the university.  Instead, additional revenue was used to increase the prestige of 
universities engaging in research by improving the quality of graduate students by 
increasing the subsidy granted these students throug  graduate and teaching 
assistantships. 
Question 1: To what degree do the competing Baumol and Bowen hypotheses 
explain expenditure changes at public four-year institutions of higher education? 
The model developed for this research establishes (at least for public universities 
in Texas) that the Bowen hypothesis explains substantially more expenditures at 
universities than the Baumol hypothesis.  The ratio of Bowen to Baumol expenses is 
highest at elite Research universities (as high as 8.4) and it is lowest at the least selective, 
least research intensive Master’s universities (as low as 3.7).  Patterns in expenditure 
change differ depending on the research intensity of he institution. 
Question 2: Do public, four-year institutions of higher education with 




Additional tuition did not lead to an expansion of Bowen expenditures relative to 
Baumol expenditures at Research institutions; indeed the ratio of Bowen to Baumol 
expenditures drops by -5%.  This ratio also decreases at Comprehensive and Master’s 
universities with low research intensity missions (-1% and -3%).  The THECB institution 
types of Emerging Research and Doctoral institutions, however, display substantial 
increases in the proportion of Bowen expenditures relative to Baumol expenditures (6% 
and 4%).  This suggests that the lower-level research universities with aspirations to 
higher research intensity shift an increasing propotion of spending toward Bowen 
expenditures in conditions of expanding revenue. 
RELATIONSHIP TO L ITERATURE  
As I wrote in the beginning of this study, given that the Baumol and Bowen 
hypotheses both have strong theoretical bases, this research was never intended to 
“prove” one or the other correct.  Rather, my goal w s to understand more fully the 
relative importance of the two hypotheses.  I find that the Bowen hypothesis explains 
substantially more expenditure behavior than the Baumol hypothesis for Texas public 
universities.  In other words, these expenditures are driven more by firm-level 
microeconomic explanations than economy-level macroeconomic explanations.  Within 
the general calculation of Baumol and Bowen costs, the results from six discrete 
instruments provide insight into why this relationship exists. 
Scale Changes. 
The cost function of universities varies based on their mix of graduate and 
undergraduate students.  One question concerning this relationship is whether a 
population of graduate students provides institutions the ability to cross-subsidize 
between groups of students or whether graduate education is itself a cost-driver.  The 
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results of this study demonstrate that cross-subsidizat on occurs.  The Scale Change 
instrument displays substantial variation by research intensity across the sector, with 
Emerging Research and Research universities displayng a large amount of potential 
cross-subsidy from graduate education to elsewhere in the university. 
The estimated amount of this subsidy drops rapidly during the study period at 
Research universities, from -$6,943 to -$4,850 (-30%) and -$3,194 to -$2,746 (-14%) at 
Emerging Research universities.  This drop results from increasing expenditures on 
teaching and graduate assistants (Figure 40).  Reducing the subsidy from graduate 
education to the rest of the university is likely an effort to improve the prestige of these 
universities by improving their input of graduate student quality and thus research and 
other forms of scholarly output from future students. 
Cost Savings. 
The results of the Cost Savings instrument suggest that, while higher ratios of 
part-time faculty per FTE student do decrease total expenditures as expected, contract 
faculty are more expensive than tenure track faculty on a per FTE student basis.  This is a 
surprising and interesting finding; it is possible that the substitution of contract faculty for 
tenure-track faculty results not in short term savings costs but rather in avoiding long-
term financial constraints (and that universities pay a contract faculty a premium for this 
flexibility). 
From 2003 to 2011, universities reduced expenditures as measured by the Cost 
Savings instrument (Figure 41).  This expenditure drop was particularly pronounced at 
Research universities ($4,821 to $2,636, -45%) and Doctoral universities ($5,154 to 
$2,383, -54%).  Smaller drops occurred at Emerging Research (-25%), Comprehensive    
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(-37%), and Master’s universities (-25%).  These drops are the result of sharp reductions 
in the ratio of full-time, non-professional employees (Figure 23). 
Revenue. 
The proportion of expenditures explained by this intrument declined for all 
institution types, ranging from a drop of -7% at Research universities to -14% at 
Comprehensive universities.  This decline reflects the greater rise in other revenue than 
total revenue (Figure 35 and Figure 36) and potentially ndicates that these new “other” 
revenue sources are less stable than core revenue. 
Productivity. 
Expenditures explained by the productivity instrument declined following tuition 
deregulation, particularly at Research universities (-30%) while Emerging Research 
universities declined -17%, Doctoral universities declined -6%, and Comprehensive and 
Master’s universities declined -2%.  These drops are correlated exactly with research 
intensity as measured by THECB institution type (Figure 44) and suggest that the role of 
full-time administrators per FTE student in explaining spending declined following 
tuition deregulation.  This finding indicates that “ dministrative bloat” following tuition 
deregulation is not a driver of increased expenditures.  Of particular note is that Research 
universities increased their ratio of tenure-track faculty to administrators following tuition 
deregulation by 6% (Figure 21). 
Compensation. 
From 2003 to 2011, all institutions exhibited real drops in expenditures explained 
by the Compensation instrument.  These drops were of similar scale, ranging from -13% 
at Research universities to -19% at Emerging Research universities (Figure 42).  Martin 
and Hill’s research suggests that 51% of salaries and 52% of benefits can be associated 
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with the Baumol hypothesis.  This study demonstrates that, at least for Texas public 
universities in this time period, the proportion of Compensation expenditures the Baumol 
hypothesis explains is substantially higher than Martin and Hill’s estimate—61% of 
salaries and 70% of benefits.  Declines in the proportion of expenditures explained by 
this instrument directly contradict the Baumol hypothesis that labor costs will increase 
faster than the general price level.  This finding s corroborated by the variables that 
measure salaries and benefits.  Figure 11 and Figure 13 demonstrate that salaries rose at 
the same level as CPI between 2003 and 2011 while ben fits increased by only 2% in real 
terms.  Compensation also varies little by THECB institution type, suggesting that all 
these universities exist in a similar labor market and pay roughly the same market-
clearing wages (with some divergence between lower compensation at Emerging 
Research universities and the rest of the sector). 
Governance. 
The low and declining level of expenditures explained by this instrument, 
combined with the failure to find evidence of a quadratic function with a global minimum 
for the tenure-track to administrator independent variable, means this study does not 
support Martin and Hill’s contention that there is a “Golden Mean” balancing the tenure-
track faculty and professional administration (Figure 45).  This removes the single 
theoretical internal structure they propose with the potential to restrain expenditure 
growth and ameliorate potential agency abuse from bth parties. 
SIGNIFICANCE  
The implications of this research are both important and positive.  Imagine, for 
example, if the Baumol hypothesis explained a greate  proportion of university 
expenditures than the Bowen hypothesis.  Universitis have limited ability to shape and 
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control the broad labor market factors that the Baumol hypothesis invokes to explain 
expenditure patterns.  Under this hypothesis, the very nature of the labor-intensive 
production function at universities would render the expense of providing a university 
education beyond the ability of families and society to afford.  The consequences of this 
increased expense would be an inevitable, revolutionary change in the provision of post-
secondary education.  Students of modest means, even solidly middle-class students, 
would find themselves locked out of a “traditional” higher education experience.  That 
experience, in turn would become both a luxury good an  a class marker to an even 
greater extent than it is currently.  Students unable to afford this luxury good would be 
forced to settle for second-best options such as impersonal, massive online courses, 
experiential credit, and a generally less personalized higher education experience.  This 
bifurcation of post-secondary education would have profound societal consequences. 
Finding that the Bowen hypothesis possesses substantially more explanatory 
power than the Baumol hypothesis provides at some hope that incremental changes in 
existing structures can address increases in student expenditures.  The problem is that 
universities lack structures to force choices betwen these competing good ideas and so 
enforce market discipline.  In a way, this research provides a case study of what happens 
when an effective structure imposing this discipline—Texas’ statutory restrictions on 
tuition increases—is removed.  One concrete way to address increasing expenditures per 
FTE student in Texas, for example, would be to reverse tuition deregulation and once 
again require public universities to make the case to the elected leadership of the state for 
tuition increases. 
Renewing this supplicant relationship also has the potential to help bridge the 
other challenge raised by the Bowen hypothesis—addressing the principal-agent 
problems that allow the misallocation of resources within non-profit firms.  A naïve 
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solution to this problem would focus on removing the “non-profit” element of the 
relationship—in other words, privatization and the introduction of the profit motive to the 
firm.  I think this would be a mistake.  Public universities are public.  We have a 
principal-agent problem in non-profit, public universities not because they are non-profit 
but because there are barriers between the public and their institutions.  Review and 
oversight of tuition and fees by elected officials goes some small way to addressing this 
but as long as this authority is delegated the ability of civil society to exert oversight on 
public university expenditures will be limited. 
The state could choose to strengthen existing oversight structures (such as 
THECB and the various boards of regents and system offices) however these other 
bureaucracies are not the principal in the principal-agent problem either and in any event 
are subject to regulatory capture.  Perhaps some part of the answer to solving the 
principal-agent problem is for the public—the true principals—to be involved more 
directly into the operation of public universities.  Imagine, for example, a committee of 
alumna/i, local civic leaders, students, and parents being brought explicitly into the 
budget formulation process at institutions in a manner similar to a local school board. 
These citizens would be able to both weigh in as independent observers on budget 
decisions and to be more broadly informed about the rationale behind those decisions. 
UNEXPECTED AND SURPRISING FINDINGS  
My expectation prior to beginning this research was that Bowen expenditures 
would be correlated with research intensity, which this study demonstrates is indeed the 
case.  I also, however, expected that following tuition deregulation the rate of growth of 
Bowen expenditures at Research universities would increase.  In other words, freed from 
the strictures of tuition control, these institutions would expand their spending on 
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internal, non-labor-market dictated activities.  Inabsolute terms, this did occur—but in 
relative terms the proportionally greater increase in Baumol expenditures was a surprise.  
I also did not expect to see this hypothesized relationship appear not in the Research 
universities but in the aspirants to top-tier research activity—the Emerging Research 
universities. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE  
There are practitioners in two realms who could find the results of this study 
enlightening.  For those making budget decisions at universities, the most profound 
finding is the massive gap between those institutions at the top of the research-intensity 
continuum and other universities.  The difference in Bowen expenditures between the 
Research and Emerging Research universities in 2011, for example, was $14,089 per 
FTE student.  This chasm of money pays for a large amount of activities (e.g., 
institutional support, laboratory facilities) that re required to compete and engage in 
research at the highest level and amounts to a qualitative difference between true research 
universities and all other institutions.  In the absence of significant additional funding, 
leaders at institutions not in the top research tier would do well to sharply restrict 
expenditures that are mere halting efforts in the dir ction of expanded research—or at 
least focus them quite deliberately. 
The other practitioners who might gain some insight from this study are those 
public officials charged with the oversight and contr l of public universities.  The 
importance that the Bowen revenue theory of costs clearly has in explaining university 
expenditures strongly implies that no set of policies allowing universities to raise these 
expenditures will ever satiate the desire for even more expenditures.  In addition, the 
failure of the only posited theoretical, internal mechanism to restrict expenditures—a 
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“Golden Mean” of faculty to administrators that keeps the worst tendencies of both in 
balance—strongly suggests that meaningful control of increases in Bowen expenditures 
must arise from some external force. 
L IMITATIONS  
The fundamental limitation of this study is that it examines public universities.  
Private universities operate in a different environme t than the public sector.  Consider a 
small undergraduate liberal arts college such as Sweet Briar College compared to 
Harvard.  Now consider Sul Ross State (a small school in Alpine, Texas) and UT Austin.  
Small private schools close if they do not attract sufficient students while prestigious, 
well-endowed universities can essentially run without any tuition revenue and use student 
fees mainly as a signal of quality and to manage alr ady overwhelming applicant pools.  
Small public schools, on the other hand, generally remain open with state support even 
with large declines in enrollment while elite public schools, even with significant 
endowments, also have large student bodies and require significant tuition revenues to 
maintain their status.  Given that there are substantial differences in Bowen and Baumol 
expenditures by THECB institution type in Texas, an even broader divergence in the 
national, private university sector should be expected. 
IMPLICATIONS  
The similar level of Baumol expenditures across THECB institutional types and 
the largely similar change in these expenditures over the course of this study suggests that 
public higher education institutions exist in a broad, national labor market for academic 
talent.  Private institutions, particularly elite private institutions, clearly play a role in 
shaping this market.  Highly-sought potential hires for tenure-track positions, for 
example, choose between competing offers from public and private institutions.  Because 
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this research was conducted on one part of the academic labor market it does not provide 
insights on how the balancing of Bowen and Baumol expenditures at market-leading elite 
private universities might have an impact at public universities. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are at least three areas of future research that could expand the 
understanding of university expenditures provided by this econometric model.  First, 
while Texas public universities have functioned in a period of flat-to-moderate increases 
in overall state support, other state policy environments have been different.  A state with 
a relatively large number of public institutions that experienced absolute budgetary 
reductions (and perhaps lower growth in real per FTE student expenditures) would 
provide an interesting counterpoint to this study, as it would examine expenditure 
decisions made to allocate cuts, rather than to alloc te additional funds.  In particular, an 
examination of cross-subsidization between graduate education and the rest of the 
institution in that policy environment would be useful.  Such a study could be performed 
in the same 2003 to 2011 period as this research using the IPEDS database. 
A second area of future research that could prove fruitful would be Texas-specific 
and would modify this econometric model to use Martin and Hill’s measurement of 
academic costs, rather than total costs.  Such a revised model would institute controls for 
athletics and other activities associated with auxiliary and non-academic functions of 
universities.  Unfortunately, the IPEDS system does not provide sufficient discrete 
employment data to isolate employment associated with academics from other university 
employment.  It is possible a state-specific database could provide this information and 
substitute for IPEDS employment data.  One particularly interesting question this second 
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research project could address is the level of cross-subsidy between core academic and 
auxiliary functions at different university types. 
A final avenue of potential research involves the production function of 
universities.  This study treats universities as single product firms producing students and 
controls for the secondary research output of multi-product firms by grouping universities 
into THECB institution types.  Assuming a reasonable metric for research output could 
be developed, the model could be modified to account for a more granular measure of the 
multi-product nature of universities. In the other direction, the model developed for this 
study could be applied to the true single-product firms in higher education: community 
colleges with controls for research intensity replaced with controls for community 
characteristics. 
CONCLUSION  
This study has presented both a case-study of tuition deregulation in public 
universities and an econometric model examining the reaction of these institutions in 
allocating expenditures following tuition deregulation.  The findings of this research are 
quite clear—that public universities possess considerable potential autonomy in making 
decisions on expenditures and are not merely blown hither and fro by the forces of the 
larger labor market.  The challenge we face is how t  create structures that ensure the 
spending choices made by leaders of these institutions do not continue to generate a 
spiraling and unsustainable rate of expenditure growth.  Hopefully this research 
demonstrates that there is a potential alternative to a dystopian future of post-secondary 
education that would, due to radically increased expenditures, exclude all but the most 





Texas Public Universities by THECB Institution Type (Fiscal Year 2011) 
Research Universities 
• Texas A&M University 
• The University of Texas at Austin 
Emerging Research Universities 
• Texas State University11 
• Texas Tech University 
• The University of Texas at Arlington 
• The University of Texas at Dallas 
• The University of Texas at El Paso 
• The University of Texas at San Antonio 
• University of Houston 
• University of North Texas 
Doctoral Universities 
• Sam Houston State University12 
• Texas A&M University – Commerce 
• Texas A&M University – Corpus Christi 
• Texas A&M University – Kingsville 
• Texas Southern University 
• Texas Woman’s University 
• The University of Texas – Pan American 
                                                
11 Texas State University was moved from Doctoral to Emerging Research in January 2012.  It is placed in 
Emerging Research for all years. 





• Lamar University-Beaumont 
• Prairie View A&M University 
• Stephen F. Austin University 
• Texas A&M International University 
• West Texas A&M University 
Master’s Universities 
• Angelo State University 
• Midwestern State University 
• Sul Ross State University 
• Sul Ross University – Rio Grande13 
• Texas A&M University-Galveston 
• Texas A&M University-Texarkana 
• The University of Texas at Brownsville14 
• The University of Texas at Tyler 
• The University of Texas of the Permian Basin 
• University of Houston- Clear Lake 
• University of Houston- Downtown 
• University of Houston- Victoria 
  
                                                
13 Sul Ross University – Rio Grande is included in Sul Ross University data in IPEDS. 
14 The University of Texas at Brownsville is excluded from this analysis due to its unique taxation and 
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